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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Marci Hamilton has chosen God vs. the Gavel as the
title for her new book on the importance, and difficulty, of bring-
ing religious conduct under the rule of law.2 To appreciate the
aptness of her title, we need only look at a snippet of testimony
from a recent criminal case in Alabama, a mundane case in most
ways, one which didn't make Hamilton's book and won't make the
casebooks, but which pits God squarely against gavel and under-
scores the intractability of the conflict. The defendant, Teresa
Ann Archie, killed her teenage daughter with a shotgun and
pleaded insanity. Her insanity was manifested, she argued, by
her belief that the murder was God's will:
Q: Why did you pull your gun out?
A: I had to do the Lord's will, I was led to get rid of her...
I had to do his will.., she was worshiping Satan... my
spirit and soul couldn't be released until I -
Q: Are you saying you read a part of the Bible that told
you what to do?
A: Yes...
... Q: You feel like everything is okay now... ?
A: Yes, I feel that my heart is pure now...'
1. J.D., Georgetown University; Ph.D., Columbia University (Philosophy); Law Clerk
to the Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
2005-06 term.
2. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005).
3. Archie v. Alabama, 875 So. 2d 336, 343 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
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The reviewing court declined to assess the validity of the alleged
duty to kill apostates, commenting that "we are in no position to
engage in a theological analysis of Archie's apparent religious be-
liefs."' And to be sure, Archie could have been more precise in her
testimony, and pointed to the specific part of the Bible she had in
mind. But to even the casual student of religion, the reference is
obvious. Archie is talking about Deuteronomy 13:6-10, which in-
structs the faithful as follows:
If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy
daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is
as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go
and serve other gods, which thou hast not known ....
Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him;
neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare,
neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill
him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to
death...
The court's reluctance to analyze the theological validity of the
alleged duty to kill Satan-worshipers is perhaps understandable,
given that the duty is unambiguously set out in the plain language
of the text. What is there to analyze? If your child contemplates
the worship of other gods, according to this text, you must kill her.
There's nothing symbolic, metaphorical, or the least bit opaque in
the instruction. To a person who believed, as one-third of all
Americans claim to, in the literal truth of every word in the Bible,'
and the Bible's sovereign authority as the source of morality, there
could be no room for debate. Archie's theology, in other words, is
completely orthodox. But here's the problem: all five judges on the
4. Archie, 875 So. 2d at 343
5. The most reputable long-term survey data, that of the General Social Survey run by
the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center, reveals a stable percentage
of about one-third (33.7% as of 1998) of Americans who choose "The Bible is the actual word
of God and is to be taken literally, word for word," among several descriptive options, in-
cluding "inspired" but not the literal word of God, and "ancient book of fables, legends,
history, and moral precepts." The GSS data is available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu.
Other less scholarly and systematic surveys have reported much higher figures. For exam-
ple, the Rasmussen polling firm found that 63% of respondents answered "yes" to the ques-
tion, "Is the Bible literally true and the word of God?" See
www.rasmussenreports.com/2005/Bible.com. I leave it to the reader to hypothesize what
percentage of those respondents would also agree that Teresa Archie was right to kill her
daughter.
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court agreed that Archie's religious beliefs sufficed as a matter of
law to establish that she was insane.'
Cases like Archie are not, it turns out, particularly rare,7 and
they force us to confront an odd cultural juxtaposition: belief in
the literal inerrancy of the Bible is a badge of honor and a cultural
sine qua non for a huge slice of the American populace, while at
the same time sufficing in courts of law to make out a legal deter-
mination of mental illness. Hamilton does not discuss religious
insanity cases, and in numerical terms they are trivial: hardly
anyone pleads insanity, and hardly any of those that do get "not
guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) verdicts. But as a theoretical
matter, the problem demands an answer: Can religious beliefs
ever be deemed insane delusions? Can they exempt defendants
from criminal liability? Are there constitutional problems with
such defenses? I will come back to insanity at the end of this Re-
6. Archie, 875 So. 2d at 344 (majority opinion) ("The record indicates that Archie was
unquestionably suffering from a severe mental illness when she killed her daughter; the
State does not argue otherwise."); id. (Shaw, J., concurring) ("[Tihe undisputed evidence
presented at trial indicated that Archie was mentally ill when she shot and killed her
daughter (a fact the State concedes) and that by virtue of delusions resulting from that
mental illness she was unable to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law."); id.
at 350 (Cobb, J., dissenting) ("The testimony in this record permits only the conclusion that
Teresa Ann Archie was insane before she shot her daughter, she was insane at the time of
the shooting, and she was insane after she shot her daughter.... The jury ignored the
overwhelming evidence regarding Archie's mental state that demonstrated that Archie
could not appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of her acts. Archie is entitled
to a judgment of acquittal.").
The conviction was affirmed, though, on the second prong of the state's insanity
test: the court held that the jury could reasonably have found that Archie retained the
ability to understand that killing was wrong. Id. at 344 ("[Ihe law in Alabama is clear.
Archie had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or wrongfulness of her acts .... [The record] provided conflicting evi-
dence as to whether Archie was able to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness
of her acts.").
7. Of course in absolute terms, insanity pleas are a rare thing in themselves, and
successful ones, still more so. But within the universe of insanity pleas, a surprising num-
ber of defendants rely straightforwardly on religious beliefs. Recent examples include
Deanna Laney, who killed her children, see infra Part IV.A; Andrea Yates, who killed her
children, see Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ron Lafferty, who
killed his sister-in-law and niece, see Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991);
Brian Kelley, who killed his daughter, see State v. Kelley, No. M2001-00461-CCA-R3-CD,
2002 WL 927610 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2002); Wanda Barzee, who kidnapped Elizabeth
Smart, see Pat Reavy, Barzee is Unfit for Trial, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 11, 2004. And defen-
dants rely on religious beliefs in asserting other defenses as well, such as lack of intent to
kill, or justification. See, e.g., Shelley Murphy, Sect Leader Convicted in Starvation of Son,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2002, at Al (Jacques Robidoux, who starved his infant son, argued
that he believed God would miraculously keep son alive); Jon Wells, Sniper: The True Story
of James Kopp, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario), June 1, 2004 (James Kopp, who murdered




view; I raise these questions here to highlight the complexity of
the relationship between religion and rule of law, and thus the
need for books like God vs. the Gavel.
The religious killing cases are extreme examples of the general
problem that motivates and structures Hamilton's book: Religious
belief, while often a salutary force in society, can also be a source
of great harm. It can incite and justify acts of violence, prejudice,
and cruelty, and it can convince believers that they are above the
law. Hamilton, the Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law at Car-
dozo School of Law, came to this realization late, after long pro-
pounding what she now sees as a naive free exercise doctrine of
broad exemptions for religious activity! Her work as an advocate
- she argued, and won, the landmark case Boerne v. Flores,9 and
most recently has represented victims of sexual abuse by Catholic
priests - slowly opened her eyes to the myriad social harms
wrought by the combination of righteous religious belief and legal
immunity, and she urges that "[tihe United States must abandon
its adolescent belief in the inevitable goodness of every religious
entity."" In God vs. the Gavel, she argues that these harms can be
largely negated by the simple expedient of applying the law neu-
trally and evenly, without allowing exceptions for religiously mo-
tivated conduct. The neutrality of law is an ancient ideal, much
criticized of late. I can't fault Hamilton for her devotion to it,
though her arguments invite a somewhat deeper descent into the
theoretical labyrinth buried under the ideal than readers will find
in this book.
God vs. the Gavel is divided into two parts. In the first, Hamil-
ton identifies six areas of law in which religious immunity is par-
ticularly problematic: children, marriage, land use, schools, pris-
ons and the military, and employment discrimination. In the sec-
ond, she makes an argument for the unconstitutionality of the Re-
8. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 7-8.
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Boerne is one of the most important constitutional law cases of
the past fifty years. In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
Court had held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require strict scrutiny of neutrally
applicable laws (in this case, drug laws) when enforced against religious conduct. In re-
sponse, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA'), which purported
to overturn Smith and set up strict scrutiny as the standard of review for all legislation
that burdened religious conduct. In Boerne, a Texas town sought to apply its historic pres-
ervation laws to a church building, and the church sued under RFRA. The Court held
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states. In so doing the Court re-asserted its own
supremacy in constitutional interpretation: the Court, not Congress, decides what standard
of review is appropriate for claims of constitutional violation.
10. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 305.
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ligious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and its state and fed-
eral progeny, and more broadly for a "harm principle" interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause.
Hamilton's "harm principle" approach to free exercise connects
the factual and theoretical halves of the book. On this view, the
state always has the power and the duty to regulate conduct
which creates risks of harm to others, and the Constitution does
not say otherwise. Religious conduct will be protected only insofar
as it does not harm people. Or, put another way, those aspects of
religious conduct that harm people fall outside the sphere of First
Amendment protection. The factual setting provided in the first
half of the book is necessary for meaningful consideration of the
theoretical issues, because Hamilton rightly insists that the actual
(as opposed to the imagined) effects of a theory of religious immu-
nity must inform debate over whether it is constitutionally re-
quired."
This Review proceeds as follows. In Part II, I will discuss some
of the problems described in the first half of Hamilton's book, and
I will add a few recent cases that highlight the extent to which
these areas of law overlap and merge together. In Part III, I will
briefly consider Hamilton's response to the arguments of Judge
Michael McConnell and others who advocate a much broader view
of the Free Exercise Clause. In Part IV, I will return to rehg-
iously-based insanity pleas, as an example of the difficult philoso-
phical and doctrinal problems inherent in applying the First
Amendment to religiously motivated conduct - problems which
will continue to plague regimes of even the strictest neutrality.
II.
A. Children
Hamilton begins the book with a truly disturbing catalogue of
recent cases of sexual abuse of children by clergy.2 As disturbing
as the details of the crimes committed - often continuously, over
years or decades, and with the knowledge of church leadership,
who were interested only in silence - is the role of the First
11. This is true because, first, there is an ineluctable tension between the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses, see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004), and second, the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is largely a function of actual social practices, at the
time of the Framing and since.
12. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 14-30.
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Amendment as aider and abetter. Religious groups reflexively
invoke free exercise to block access to damning documents, to
avoid paying settlements, or to challenge the legitimacy of the
charges themselves. Hamilton argues that the civil liberties ad-
vocacy groups who police the Bill of Rights "have not been focused
on the plight of children, unless they were vehicles for larger
agendas."14
While sexual abuse in the Catholic Church has been most
widely publicized, it is rampant in other denominations as well.
Widespread sexual abuse within Jehovah's Witness and Mormon
communities has also been alleged and documented in recent
years. The common denominators appear to be a patriarchal so-
cial structure and an authoritarian hierarchy. Always the pattern
is the same: the church imbues some men with near-absolute
power, over its women or children or both, power which is said to
reflect God's will. Disobedience is a sin, and appeal to outside au-
thorities is heresy." The key to breaking the cycles of sexual
abuse that are thus begotten is to break the seal separating the
religious group from civil society. So long as religious groups can
keep their members walled off from "outsiders," those members
13. A representative recent case in this regard is Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The plaintiff, an adult woman,
brought several tort claims against a priest and diocese, including emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent supervision. The plaintiff alleged that the
priest manipulated her religiosity and deference to ecclesiastical authority to induce her to
engage in sexual conduct. Relying on similar cases involving attorneys and doctors, the
plaintiff claimed that the priest "knew [that the plaintiffs] piety made her readily subject
to manipulation and control by a pastor, and her judgment and ability to resist . . .his
advances [would be] substantially compromised by her religious faith and trust." Richelle
L., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. The court refused to hear any of the claims: "Appellant's claim
that the depth of her religious faith rendered her vulnerable to Reverend Namocatcat could
not be adjudicated without reference to the nature of her religious beliefs and the doctrines
of her church." Id.
Whatever one thinks of the merits of a tort action brought by an adult on the basis
of concededly consensual sexual activity, the breadth of the theory of dismissal is stunning.
Is there not a real question of fact as to whether the priest abused a position of trust and
authority and injured the plaintiff in so doing? Doctors and attorneys are subject to liabil-
ity in such cases, as the court noted, id. at 607. Why not priests? The court's unthinking
refusal to hear any claim that would involve "reference to her religious beliefs" is, to many
commentators, an abdication of the courts' basic function of factfinding, and this sort of
broad "religious question" exemption is coming under increasing academic scrutiny. See,
e.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a 'Religious Questions' Doctrine? Judicial Authority To
Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 534-40 (2005) (arguing
that courts are perfectly competent, institutionally and constitutionally, to find facts about
the content of religious doctrines and beliefs, just as they find facts about the content of
contracts or foreign law).
14. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 17.
15. See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 14, 25.
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will be unable or unwilling to look to the state for help when sexu-
ally assaulted by the men in charge.
Consideration of this dynamic, which informs all of the clergy
abuse cases detailed by Hamilton, suggests a difficult problem for
our education jurisprudence: Is there not a fundamental conflict
between, on the one hand, the interest of civil society and democ-
racy of all citizens' interacting with the broader community, and,
on the other, the desire of religious organizations to sequester
their children from contact with the broader community?
Fundamentalists of all stripes assert a constitutional right to
keep their children out of school in order that they may prevent
their children from being exposed to influences and ideas which
are inconsistent with the tenets of the parents' religion.
Homeschooling and religious schooling are also unfortunately fre-
quent sites of two common forms of abuse visited upon children by
religious authority figures, including parents: violent assaults in
the name of discipline, and denial of medical care.
Conversely, when religious parents send their children to public
schools, they often demand exemptions from rules which conflict
with their religious practices. These conflicts have been sparked
by such apparent mundanities as dress codes and hair-length re-
strictions, but also by course content and coed instruction. 6 The
most dramatic of the cases have involved Sikh boys, who by tradi-
tion are required to carry a knife with them at all times. 7
Throughout, Hamilton's point is simple: the task of pursuing the
public good while accommodating the preferences of a diverse
populace is quintessentially one for the legislature, not the courts.
She puts an interesting twist on this oft-repeated nostrum, by
observing that in the school-rules cases, the only parties before the
court are the aggrieved religious parents and the school system,
and the only issue before the court is the accommodation of the
parents' religious preferences. The question of the needs of the
rest of the school-going public never arises, or does so only indi-
rectly, and in the background. Thus the courts have a narrow and
lopsided perspective on the actual social problem of managing a
school system. The result of this myopia is occasional rulings or-
dering elaborate and costly accommodations on constitutional
grounds, based on a skimpy factual record, and, sometimes, the
judges' own speculations about the ease of accommodation. It is
16. See id. at 138-39.
17. See id. at 114-18.
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tempting indeed for judges to opine that it just can't be that big a
deal to let a kid wear a yarmulke in a basketball game,18 but,
Hamilton argues, to yield to that temptation is to commit the
worst of modern judicial sins: legislating from the bench. If the
legislature wants to waive neutrally-applicable rules for religious
groups, it may do so (subject to Establishment Clause constraints),
but there is no reason for courts to read broad universal waivers
into the Free Exercise Clause.
The same sort of waiver theory is at work much more perni-
ciously in the faith-healing and "discipline" cases. Hamilton cites
numerous examples of parents who horribly abuse their children,
either by denying them medical care as they slowly die from easily
treatable illnesses, or by subjecting them to violent assaults in the
name of discipline.19 Some religious parents beat their children
themselves; others hand them over to violent pastors. Hamilton's
examples of "disciplinary" violence against children are perhaps -
if it is possible - more disturbing than the sexual abuse cases
because, in the discipline cases, the church officials were acting
openly and claiming explicit biblical authority for their abuse.
Hamilton reminds us that "corporal punishment is still a tenet of
some religious organizations."0
In all these cases, as in the home-schooling cases, the parents
want to waive on behalf of their children the state's offer of protec-
tion from harm or the benefits of education. "We don't need you,"
say the parents, "we want to be left alone, in our closed society."
And to a certain extent, the Constitution respects that desire. But
how far do we want to allow parents to isolate their children from
the "corrupting" influence of the world outside the church? It is
easy enough to see the harm inflicted when a pastor beats a 4
year-old child to death with a metal carpenter's level for the sin of
opening a bathroom door and seeing another child naked.21 The
harms inflicted by social isolation are less easily articulable, but
18. See id. at 123-26 (discussing Menora v. Illinois High School Assoc., 683 F.2d 1030
(7th Cir. 1982)).
19. See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 31-44. I will say no more here about the cases of
physical abuse described in the book, except that they are truly horrifying.
20. Id. at 41. And those of us who have lived in Bible Belt communities need no re-
minding.
21. See id. at 40. And here, as always, there is a Biblical text that can be called upon
to justify the violence. Recall that Noah's son Ham and all his descendants were cursed for
Ham's having opened Noah's tent flap and found his father passed out naked in a drunken
stupor. Genesis 9:18-25. The story was used for centuries to justify hereditary slavery,
with Africans and African-Americans taking the metaphorical part of "children of Ham."
Vol. 44232
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no less real. The harm identified by courts in home-schooling
cases is typically the disabilities in employment and social life oc-
casioned by inadequate education. But to specify that harm in
any particular case, do we not need to specify the ways in which
the specific program in question is lacking - in other words, the
ways in which the doctrines the child is taught are not true? And
if so, then the Ballard principle2 3 - which, I should stress, is
judge-made law - is on a collision course with the state's interest
in an educated populace. To see the explosiveness of this problem,
we need only ask whether a state may constitutionally mandate
that all children receive an education in science. A religious sect
that refused to teach its children to read and write would pre-
sumably not prevail on free exercise grounds. At some point,
states may be ready to assert that the refusal to teach children
about biology, geology, chemistry, astronomy, and so forth, is simi-
larly unprotected.
The problem here is that the right to home-school only has value
as a right if it applies in situations in which the home education
does not mirror the public education. 4 If we recognize the home-
schooling right only when the education offered at home is equiva-
lent to that in the public school, the right is not doing any work as
a right; it is needed as a right precisely by those parents who ve-
hemently reject secular society. And if it allows parents to deprive
their children of a meaningful education, then we have to ask
whether it should be a right at all.
A person's rejection of secular society is, generally speaking,
constitutionally protected. But it cannot be indefinitely so. How
far can a democracy, which relies at every moment for its contin-
ued existence on the public participation of its citizens, allow par-
22. See, e.g., Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District, 712 F.2d 96, 97 (4th
Cir. 1983) ("A] state has a compelling interest in compulsory education, in order to 'pre-
pare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our political system' and to 'pre-
pare individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.") (quoting Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)); id. at 98 ("Duro refuses to enroll his children in
any public or nonpublic school for any length of time, but still expects them to be fully inte-
grated and live normally in the modern world upon reaching the age of 18.... Duro has
not demonstrated that home instruction will prepare his children to be self-sufficient par-
ticipants in our modern society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political
system, which, as the Supreme Court stated, is a compelling interest of the state.").
23. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that the state must remain
neutral as to the truth or falsity of religious beliefs).
24. For examples of cases holding that home-schooling may be permitted only upon a
showing that the curriculum taught roughly mirrors that in the public schools, see Care
and Protection of Charles and Others, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987), and State v. Massa, 231
A.2d 252 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
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ents to teach their children that the world outside their church is
evil and corrupting? 5 Here as elsewhere, the comforting rhetoric
of religious freedom can mask some very troubling practices that
put children at risk of serious and permanent harms. Further, it
can prevent the state from recognizing those harms for what they
are, and from defending the children's interests.
I have no proposal to resolve this dilemma, nor does Hamilton.
All we can do is insist that our policymakers and courts recognize
that there is a dilemma here that must be dealt with from case to
case. Most people would agree that denying your child food or
medical care is going too far. How about denying your child a
meaningful education? Is education like food and medical care?
How about consenting to your 14 year-old daughter's marriage to
a 22 year-old?" How about consenting to your 13 year-old daugh-
ter's polygamous marriage as the tenth wife of a 54 year-old
man?27 At the very least, the First Amendment cannot be a com-
plete bar to state regulation of such conduct.
B. Gay Marriage
But what, we might ask, is so bad about civil society? Why do so
many religious fundamentalists want to keep their children se-
questered from the secular world? A large part of the answer - if
there remained any doubt after the 2004 elections - seems to be
fundamentalists' fear that civil society might grant its imprimatur
to same-sex marriage. Why this fear looms so large in the psyches
of religious fundamentalists is beyond the scope of this Essay, but
that it does is not in dispute. Hamilton's chapter on marriage ana-
lyzes religious opposition to gay marriage, and accuses opponents
of gay marriage of trying to legislate from the pulpit. This obser-
vation is important for constitutional analysis - because, among
other things, legislatures cannot enact religious doctrine as law
under the Establishment Clause - but Hamilton's discussion of
gay marriage is disappointingly short, and remains at the level of
policy debate.
25. And query whether home-schooling might thus be a context in which the Republi-
can Form of Government Clause could eventually be held to be justiciable. See U.S. CONST.
Art. 4, Par. 4; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (holding that clause to be nonjusticiable).
26. See infra text accompanying note 55 (discussing such a case).
27. See JOHN KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 20-23 (2003) (discussing such
a case).
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Of course there is a plausible argument that the question of gay
marriage should be a policy debate as opposed to a constitutional
debate. It may be argued, for example, that absent an extension
of Carolene Products"5 "suspect class" status to gays, legislatures
are not constrained by constitutional limits on their definitions of
marriage. Hamilton doesn't flesh out any full-blown constitu-
tional arguments with respect to gay marriage. She is simply con-
cerned to establish - and does so effectively - that opposition to
gay marriage is a largely (indeed one might say wholly) religious
position. From this premise, though, her conclusion, that our
"pluralist society is the result of the Constitution's best aspira-
tions," " is strangely anemic. Is that really all there is to say about
the constitutionality of the various "marriage definition" laws? To
be sure, I agree that in the light of our nation's history as a haven
for persecuted religious minorities, it's unseemly for religious
groups to try to insert their doctrines into the civil law. But be-
yond that aspirational proposition, there is also a long history of
caselaw on the constitutional dimensions of marriage, and it's all
missing from Hamilton's chapter. For a book about religion and
the rule of law, this omission is jarring. Hamilton's readers might
come away wondering whether the Constitution is implicated in
the gay marriage debate at all.
Rest assured, it is, through at least three provisions: the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment. This subject has been widely discussed in the
academy in the wake of Lawrence ° and the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court's Goodridge decision,31 so there is no need to
embark on lengthy explanations in this Essay, except to note that
28. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
29. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 66.
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
31. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (holding
under the Massachusetts Constitution that providing "civil union" status but not marriage
to same-sex couples violated equal protection and due process). Recent commentary in-
cludes Nancy K. Kubasek, Alex Frondorf, & Kevin J. Minnick, Civil Union Statutes: A
Shortcut to Legal Equality for Same-Sex Partners in a Landscape Littered with Defense of
Marriage Acts, 15 FLA. J. LAW. & PUB. POLY 229 (2004); Mark Strasser, Lawrence and
Same-Sex Marriage Bans: On Constitutional Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1003 (2004); Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2081 (2005); Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare not
Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1945-51 (2004); Same-Sex Marriage Symposium
Issue, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273, 273- 662 (2004); Symposium on Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 1-182 (2002).
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Hamilton's discussion of gay marriage is incomplete. It estab-
lishes that the marriage definition bills are essentially statements
of religious doctrine, but it doesn't explain why that might be a
legal problem. The chapter, thus, would have benefited from ref-
erence to some of the following considerations.
A statutory ban on gay marriage might, first of all, be properly
seen - given Hamilton's cultural sketch - as an attempt to enact
religious doctrine as law. A state cannot enact religious doctrine
as law under the Establishment Clause, so the crucial question for
an Establishment clause challenge would be whether the legisla-
ture had a non-religious basis for the law. This question will often
be, in practice, whether the legislators were able to refrain from
the kind of explicitly religious triumphalist rhetoric that has been
associated with these proposals. If legislators take to the floor and
declare that they have fulfilled God's will by enshrining Paul's
Letter to the Corinthians in the statute books, Establishment
Clause challenges to the law will be that much easier.32
Further, all laws are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Plaintiffs burdened by an allegedly discriminatory
law usually lose if they are not members of a suspect (or "quasi-
suspect") class, because without that necessary trigger to invoke
heightened scrutiny, discriminatory laws need only meet rational
basis review, which is highly deferential.3 The problem for the
marriage-definition laws is that it is not always easy to articulate
any basis for them other than the religious one, and that one can-
not constitutionally speak its name. And just as the legislature
32. This precise dynamic was displayed in the successful Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the Dover, Pennsylvania, school board's adoption of an "intelligent design" science
curriculum. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., No.04cv2688 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
2005). The board's defense was that "intelligent design" is not a religious doctrine, but the
court found to the contrary that the board members had a long record of advocating teach-
ing creationism, and that the "intelligent design" policy was conceived as a means to intro-
duce religion into the schools. Id. at 94-132 (page after page of detailed recitation of facts
showing explicit religious purpose, harassment of opponents on religious grounds, and so
on. Good reading.). See also Laurie Goodstein, In Intelligent Design Case, a Cause in
Search of Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005 (describing the long effort by the Thomas More
Center, a group dedicated to "protect[ing] Christians and their beliefs in the public square"
to persuade any school district in the country to teach intelligent design so as to prompt a
lawsuit, and noting that the school board's counsel advised the board that "opponents
would have a strong case because board members had a lengthy public record of advocating
'putting religion back in the schools.'"). The issue may be mooted in Dover, though, because
every single member of the school board was defeated in the Nov. 8 elections by a slate of
candidates who ran on a pro-evolution platform. Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Slate Outpolls
Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005.
33. See generally, e.g., TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16 (summarizing
caselaw).
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may not codify religious doctrine, neither may it legislate solely on
the basis of animus toward a group." The no-animus rule applies
to all classes, not just the suspect classes, and a law which simply
says that men may not marry men and women may not marry
women certainly runs the risk of appearing to be based on animus.
No one doubts the sincerity of religious conservatives who are out-
raged by gay marriage. But then no one doubted the sincerity of
segregationists, either. The issue in each case is whether those
particular preferences may be constitutionally embodied in legis-
lation.
In addition, there remains the very straightforward argument,
accepted by the court Baehr v. Miike,3" that what is going on in
these laws is just ordinary gender discrimination. If that is the
case, then all the Court's gender jurisprudence comes into play,
including United States v. Virginia, the VMI Case, which comes
fairly close to requiring strict scrutiny for gender-based classifica-
tions." You don't need to argue animus or religious motive if you
have the weight of VMI behind you.
Finally, you might not even need to argue discrimination of any
kind, because the Supreme Court has long held that marriage is a
"fundamental right" under the 14th Amendment.37 The marriage
cases are a branch of the same line of substantive due process
cases that have articulated the general right to privacy in repro-
duction and sexual intimacy. This is another irony of the religious
outcry over Lawrence: Lawrence is the fruit of precisely the same
doctrinal tree as Zablocki. Marriage is sacred to the Constitution
34. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
35. CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
36. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) ("Without equating gender
classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin, the
Court, in post-Reed decisions, has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or
denies opportunity to women (or to men). . . [Claselaw evolving since 1971 reveal[s] a
strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid. To summarize the Court's cur-
rent directions for cases of official classification based on gender: Focusing on the differen-
tial treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must
determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State must show at least
that 'the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.' The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.") (internal citations omitted). For a
discussion of the applicability of the VMI standard of review in various contexts, see Val-
orie Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions,
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 68, 80-83 (2002).
37. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978).
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only to the extent that the Constitution embodies some set of sub-
stantive due process "fundamental liberties."" If the Constitution
does not (as Justice Scalia has so often argued), then laws burden-
ing marriage are not presumptively illegitimate as such. For reli-
gious conservatives, this is a classic baby-bathwater problem.
In any event, the black-letter law is straightforward: laws which
burden the right to marry are subject to strict scrutiny; that is,
they must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
ment interest. Thus the three constitutional provisions interact to
raise the question whether the religious opposition of some sects
to any same-sex marriage being recognized by the state can be a
valid state interest, in a society dedicated to the rule of neutral
principles of law. And if not, then can the state meet its justifica-
tional burden even under deferential rational basis review?
In Baehr, for example, the court ruled that the state's opposite-
sex-only marriage law discriminated on the basis of gender, and
that therefore the state had to overcome strict scrutiny by showing
that the prohibition on gay marriage furthered a compelling state
interest.39 On remand, the state argued that its interest was the
well-being of the children who might be born into such marriages,
and put on expert witnesses who testified as to the fitness of
same-sex couples to raise children. After a lengthy trial, the court
concluded: "Simply put, Defendant has failed to establish or prove
that the public interest in the well-being of children and families,
or the optimal development of children will be adversely affected
by same-sex marriage."40 Indeed, this formulation suggests that
the state's evidence would have been insufficient to overcome even
rational basis scrutiny, let alone the more demanding standard!4
The question of what can constitute a sufficient state interest
has particular force in the gay marriage cases, because the inter-
est actually insisted upon by the public supporters of the laws is
almost always articulated in either religious terms or simple ani-
mus.42 If the Constitution rules out animus and religious doctrine,
38. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-85 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
39. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
40. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 para. 139.
41. The Hawaii constitution was subsequently amended to expressly give the legisla-
ture the power to define marriage. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (recogniz-
ing that the amendment overruled its prior gay-marriage holding).
42. The argument that allowing gays to marry would legitimize homosexuality, for
example, is a classic animus argument. If, for example, I protest that "traditional values
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then states may be hard pressed to satisfy rational basis review,
let alone intermediate or strict scrutiny. Simply put, said the
Baehr court, the state had put on nothing except the majority's
animus, and that's not enough. Same-sex marriage involves peo-
ple seeking to engage in activity that does not harm third parties,
where the only objection is that it offends others' religious sensi-
bilities.
This is also, and more famously (and more to the point, still
good law), the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Goodridge. I don't want to belabor the argument any further, and
I shouldn't have had to: Hamilton should have included these
cases in her book, because her harm principle applies perfectly in
this context. If courts start recognizing a constitutional right to
marry for gay couples, it will be because they apply a meaningful
harm principle to rational basis review, and reject the argument
that religious outrage constitutes harm. The state may not dis-
criminate against people, or burden their fundamental rights,
simply because many religious people think God wants it that
way.
Hamilton should also have included these cases in her book be-
cause, probably more than any other single issue in the courts to-
day, marriage is where the action is when it comes to neutrality,
religion, and the law. From time immemorial - or at least from
the 1960s, when these cases started cropping up - courts have
consistently held, without much discussion, that the gender com-
ponent of marriage laws was the very epitome of legal neutrality.
It didn't discriminate, it didn't take sides, it simply defined, in
neutral terms, an institution that was open to all. When the state
denied marriage licenses to gay couples, or refused to recognize
their relationships for various legal purposes, that wasn't dis-
crimination, that was simply neutral enforcement of a neutral
definition of a neutral institution.43 But that edifice - or facade,
will be undermined" if gays are allowed to marry, then you are entitled, even on rational
basis review, to an explanation of what those values are and how gay marriage will under-
mine them. Thus I'll have to give some non-circular account of the content of the relevant
values. If my value is simply that gays shouldn't marry, then obviously it will be under-
mined if gays are allowed to marry. But the value, stated that way, is simple animus, and
if I restate it as "Gays shouldn't marry because God ordained marriage as a heterosexual
union," or whatever, then it is exposed as a religious concern, also an illegitimate basis for
legislation.
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (upholding denial of
marriage license to two women against constitutional challenge because "appellants are
prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County
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depending on one's perspective - has been shaking of late, and
has crumbled completely in some jurisdictions." The furor over
marriage suggests that at least on some issues (and issues par-
ticularly dear to religion) there is no such thing as legal neutrality
- or if there is, no one can agree on what it means.45
C. Statutory Rape and Polygamy
The principle that public distaste is not a sufficient basis for
discriminatory legislation is quite a new development in equal
protection law, and is already having some dramatic effects in
state courts. Kansas v. Limon4" is the best case in point. It in-
volved a "Romeo and Juliet" exception to the state's statutory rape
law which provided for lighter penalties when the older partner
was 18 and the younger partner was 14 or over. However, the ex-
ception only applied to heterosexual relationships. An 18 year-old
who, like Matthew Limon, had sex with a 14 year-old partner of
the same gender, faced the full statutory rape penalty.
The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that, although the law
faced only rational basis review, Lawrence and Romer ' required
that it have some justification other than society's moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct. Lawrence does seem pretty clear
about that proposition: the Court adopted a paragraph from Jus-
tice Stevens' Bowers dissent" to the effect that "the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice."49 Lest there be any doubt whether the
quoted language is dicta or holding, the Court continued that
"Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been control-
ling in Bowers and should control here."5" The Kansas court, tak-
ing Lawrence at its word, scrutinized the list of justifications prof-
Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapabil-
ity of entering into a marriage as that term is defined.").
44. Including South Africa, as of this writing.
45. The same might be said of abortion, an issue which, also somewhat strangely, does
not appear in this book at all.
46. State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
47. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
50. Id. at 578.
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fered by the state,"' and found - just as the Baehr court had -
that they were all lacking. 2 The court concluded:
The status-based distinction in the Kansas Romeo and
Juliet statute is so broad and so divorced from supporting
facts that we cannot discern a relationship to the facially
legitimate interest of protecting public health, and "its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons of-
fered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects."53
As interpreted by the Kansas court, Lawrence provides a way
around the suspect class issue: if discrimination against gays
based on moral disapproval alone is insufficient for rational basis
purposes, then discriminatory laws fall regardless of the classifi-
cation of gays for Carolene Products purposes. In Kansas, after
Limon, moral disapproval alone cannot support legislation, at
least unless the U.S. Supreme Court takes another case and clari-
fies Lawrence. But it's tough to see what else the Court could
have meant in Lawrence. The Court certainly did not say that
gays are a suspect class. And if the Lawrence holding is that in-
timate sexual conduct is a fundamental right under the privacy
cases, the Limon result might be required as well, because the
law's burden on Limon's exercise of that right would need to be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest,
and as the decision established, it could not meet that test.
One way to extract a rule of law from Lawrence but exclude Li-
mon from its coverage would be to read Lawrence as establishing a
fundamental privacy right to consensual intimate sexual conduct,
51. Limon, 122 P.3d at 32-38. For example, public health concerns provided no rational
basis for the law, because
[t]here is a near-zero chance of acquiring the HIV infection through the conduct
which gave rise to this case, oral sex between males, or through cunnilingus.
And, although the statute grants a lesser penalty for heterosexual anal sex, the
risk of HIV transmission during anal sex with an infected partner is the same
for heterosexuals and homosexuals.
Id. at 37.
52. Id. at 38 ("The Romeo and Juliet statute suffers the same faults as found by the
United States Supreme Court in Romer and Eisenstadt; adding the phrase 'and are mem-
bers of the opposite sex' created a broad, overreaching, and undifferentiated status-based
classification which bears no rational relationship to legitimate State interests. Paraphras-
ing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Romer, the statute inflicts immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justification that may be
claimed for it. Furthermore, the State's interests fail under the holding in Lawrence that
moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest.").
53. Id. at 37 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972)).
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but only between adults, and at the same time to explicitly reject
the "no moral condemnation" rational-basis reading. Because, this
argument would go, Limon had no protected right to engage in sex
with a minor, and his relationship with the minor was not within
the protected sphere of privacy, the statute did not burden a fun-
damental right and thus need not meet strict scrutiny. Further-
more, because Lawrence - on this reading - did not rule out
moral sentiment as a legitimate grounds for a discriminatory clas-
sification, and gays are not a protected class, the statute need only
meet rational basis scrutiny, which it survives because its basis,
moral disapproval, is a legitimate one.
Whether this reading is viable remains to be seen. Given the
Court's explicit adoption of Justice Stevens' Bowers analysis, I am
inclined to doubt it. If the Court does take up Limon, though, it
will have to clarify whether Lawrence really stands for a robust
"no moral condemnation" principle, and Lawrence's holding may
end up being narrowed considerably.' But Limon is not the only
case likely to come out of the state courts in the next few years
trailing some of Lawrence's loose threads. Consider, for example,
the case of Matthew Koso. In 2004, Koso, a 22 year-old Nebraska
man, impregnated his 14 year-old girlfriend. When they began
their sexual relationship, she was 13, and he was 21." Her par-
ents strongly objected, and got an order of protection against Koso.
But the relationship continued, and the girl got pregnant. Her
parents then consented to the couple's marriage, so they drove to
Kansas, where marriage by a 14 year-old is legal with parental
consent, and were married. However, in Nebraska, unlike in Kan-
54. Some commentators have suggested that that is already happening in lower-court
applications of Lawrence. See, e.g., Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2858, 2858
(2005) ('Lawrence v. Texas seemed to herald the dawn of a new era of tolerance for sexual
minorities, of government withdrawal from regulation of adult sexual conduct, and even of
the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. But as a number of state and
lower federal courts began to read the opinion narrowly, hope withered for many into frus-
tration, wariness, and even despair. Just two years after the decision, it has already be-
come de rigueur in scholarly and popular writing to reference wistfully what Lawrence
might have been and to lament what it has become.").
On the other hand, Professor Goldberg has recently argued that Lawrence is only
the latest manifestation of the Court's discomfort with explicitly morals-based legislation.
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2005). Goldberg argues that [n]otwithstanding
its ubiquitous rhetorical endorsements of government's police power to promote morality, it
turns out that the Court has almost never relied exclusively and overtly on morality to
justify government action." Id. at 1235-36.
55. The girl was the younger sister of one of Koso's friends. When they met, she was 8,
and he was 16. See 20/20, ABC News Transcripts, September 16, 2005.
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sas, the marriage was invalid and no defense to rape." Upon the
couple's return to Nebraska, Koso was charged with statutory
51
rape. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.
This case highlights the extent to which the vulnerability of
children to severe harm in the name of adults' religious freedom
should be a primary factor in any "public good" free exercise
analysis.58 Why, after all, did the girl's parents consent to the
marriage? Ought the state to allow parents this power? How can
a state give parents the power to waive, on behalf of their daugh-
ter, the state's protection against rape? Isn't the whole point of
statutory rape law to protect minors against their own immature
choices and manipulation by older men? That's why in statutory
rape prosecutions, both the minor's consent and the defendant's
knowledge of the minor's age are irrelevant: the law requires that
men not have sex with children, period.59 The usual justification
for strict-liability statutory rape laws is that children shouldn't be
having sex with adults - not that children shouldn't be having
sex with adults unless their parents consent. We don't let parents
simply waive prosecution of other crimes committed against their
children. Parents cannot consent to their children's murder; they
cannot even consent to the provision of alcohol to their children.
Yet Kansas allows them to consent to their children's rape?
The fact cannot be escaped that people do these things, and
many other terrible things, to their children in the name of relig-
ion. The neutrally applicable laws prohibiting violence and abuse
of others will always, then, create burdens for religious practice, at
least at the margins. One could imagine, in a pre-Boerne world, a
56. Marriage is, however, a defense to statutory rape in Kansas. The Kansas statutory
rape law provides that [it shall be a defense to a prosecution of aggravated indecent liber-
ties with a child as provided in subsection (a)(1), (a)(2)(A) and (a)(3)(A) that the child was
married to the accused at the time of the offense." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503(a)(3)(B)(b)
(2005). One could imagine a range of possible constitutional challenges to the Nebraska
prosecution, the effective articulation of which would presumably be dependent on whether
any well-funded religious liberty litigation groups choose to involved. The facts could cut
either way (pro: her parents' consent; con: her age, the restraining order). Unfortunately,
in this case, Koso's guilty plea has mooted the constitutional challenge. No doubt, though,
there are many more cases awaiting public attention and prosecution.
57. Gretchen Ruethling, Nebraska Man Sentenced for Having Sex with Girl, 13, NEW
YORK TImES, Feb. 8, 2006, at A13.
58. While it is not clear what role religion played in the girl's parents' decision itself,
religion has been a theme in public discussion of the case.
59. See, e.g., 65 AM. JUR. 2D (Rape) § 36 ('It is generally held in the absence of statute,
that the defendant's knowledge of the age of the female is not an essential element of the
crime of statutory rape and therefore it is no defense that the accused reasonably believed
that the prosecutrix was of the age of consent.").
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RFRA-based challenge to the prosecution of Koso, to wit: Koso's
exercise of his religious beliefs (thou shalt marry her once thou
hast impregnated her) is being unduly burdened by the applica-
tion of the statutory rape law. That is certainly the tone of many
of the angry letters the Nebraska Attorney General has received."
For example, a writer identifying himself as a pastor wrote, "You
mean to tell me that after we counsel young couples to do the hon-
orable thing and marry, you want to prosecute? You can't be seri-
ous."61 Another writer asked, "Would you prefer an abortion? An
unmarried mother? A mother of 14 with her husband in prison?"
6 2
To which the Attorney General responded: "We will always prose-
cute grown men for having sex with children.' The answer to
both questions, in other words, is that the law would prefer that
the grown man not have sex with the child. The justification for
statutory rape laws is simple: children cannot meaningfully con-
sent to sex with adults. The "pastor" seems to have missed this
point entirely, referring to such situations as involving "young
couples," and ignoring the age, maturity, and power disparities
entirely.
As Marc Spindelman has argued forcefully in the context of
Lawrence, the dark side of a broad-sweeping privacy protection for
sexual activity is the potential immunization of coercive sex under
the umbrella of a benign "intimacy" that makes relationships
"more enduring":
The commonplace that sexual intimacy of the sort Law-
rence approves should be heralded as the measure of non-
violation has been uncovered as a myth, a way of ignoring
and protecting the widespread abuses, including sexual
assault, domestic violence, and sexual abuse of children,
by more powerful partners in intimate relationships,
typically, though not exclusively, men. When sexual in-
timacy is thought to be normatively good, the basis for re-
lationships "more enduring," as it is in Lawrence, how
can it (also) be a prison of abuse? '
60. See Leslie Reed, Child-Bride Case in Public Eye: Bruning Gets Earful, Most from




64. Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1634-35
(2004).
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Spindelman's fear is that judicial validation, ex ante, of the con-
stitutional sanctity of sexual relationships, will hinder prosecution
of crimes of violence and abuse to the extent that perpetrators can
assert that the charged acts took place within a protected intimate
relationship. Whether or not Lawrence has had such an effect is
extremely difficult to say. Spindelman had Limon in mind,6 and
it might be thought that the result in Limon vindicates Spindel-
man's worry to some extent, if we read the Limon court as having
extended some sort of privacy protection to Limon's conduct.
But the Kansas court did nothing of the kind. Limon is not a
privacy decision at all. It is an equal protection decision. It uses
Lawrence not for the proposition that intimate relationships are
within the sphere of unregulable privacy, but rather for the propo-
sition that majoritarian moral disapproval of conduct cannot in
itself be a sufficient justification for any state regulation under
rational basis review. The court - and indeed Limon himself -
accepts, and casts no doubt on, the legitimacy of criminalization of
the sort of private sexual conduct at issue. The only question was
whether the state could legitimately attach greater penalties to
same-sex conduct than to opposite-sex conduct. Thus there was no
possibility that - as Spindelman worried - the young boy with
whom Limon engaged in sex might lose the state's protection
against abuse, coercion, or violence under the rubric of "privacy."
The only question was whether that boy would have more protec-
tion (in the form of a harsher sentence for Limon) than a similarly
situated girl would have had. Nothing in Limon questions the
validity of statutory rape laws, or calls the "Romeo and Juliet" re-
lationship a "more enduring" one deserving of constitutional pro-
tection.
Limon does, though, plant seeds for challenges to other laws
that appear to be founded purely on majoritarian disapproval of
particular groups or conduct. It is easy to imagine religious
groups mounting such challenges, most immediately against po-
lygamy prohibitions. And the expanded privacy protection argu-
ment will surely be pressed as well. Thus while Lawrence, and its
progeny like Limon, may seem to be at odds with the immediate
policy preferences of religious conservatives, it is also true that
sexual practices associated with fundamentalist Christianity -
notably early marriage and polygamy - are also the subject of
65. See id. at 1645-46.
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criminal sanctions and also may be defended (though not yet suc-
cessfully) on privacy grounds.
Hamilton downplays Lawrence's significance to the marriage
cases. "[Tihe link between Lawrence and polygamy is far more
tenuous than it appears at first blush. Consensual practices in-
volving adults constitute a category decidedly distinct from the
definition of marriage, which determines legitimacy, inheritance,
and numerous other legal consequences." No doubt there is a
distinction. But it is probably not quite so clear-cut. Lawrence
protects intimate relationships, and does so with extraordinarily
broad language. Kennedy's "this is not about marriage" dis-
claimer is dicta,67 and while Scalia's Chicken-Little dissent might
be a bit hyperbolic, Lawrence-based challenges to Reynolds" are
not self-evidently frivolous. 9 Is the "intimate relationship" of a
polygamous marriage "more enduring" than one involving multi-
ple unmarried partners? Undoubtedly. Whether that extra quan-
tum of intimacy is sufficient to warrant protection under Lawrence
is, at the very least, a viable question."
66. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 69.
67. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ('The present case .... does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter."). Like the Blakely footnote in which the Court reminded readers that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were not yet before it, see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305
n.9 (2004) ("The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on
them."), the quoted sentence does not say that the considerations underlying the Court's
decision in Lawrence would not apply in a marriage case. It simply says that Lawrence is
not such a case.
68. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
69. See, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (D. Ut. 2005). In Bron-
son, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the mar-
ried plaintiffs constitutional challenge, under Lawrence, to the county clerk's refusal to
grant him another marriage license, but the court commented:
Plaintiffs refer to the dissent of Justice Scalia in Lawrence, where he contends
that the majority's ruling will call into question state laws against bigamy,
among other statutes that are based upon moral choices.... That is likely to be
true. But the Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents cited above remain
controlling law for this Court.
Bronson, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundanental Right" that Dare
not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1894, 1945-46 ("Same-sex marriage ... is bound to
follow; it is only a question of time. For what, after all, could be the rationale for permit-
ting an otherwise eligible same-sex couple to enjoy the tangible benefits and assume the
legal obligations of some version of civil union but withholding from them the final measure
of respect? ... As Justice Scalia rightly recognized, "'preserving the traditional institution
of marriage" is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex
couples.'") (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2488
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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However, the harm principle requires a factual analysis of the
actual practice of polygamy; polygamy prohibitions need not be
based on simple animus or public distaste. Hamilton does a good
job of distinguishing the factual settings of polygamy and gay
marriage. The danger of sloppy thinking is particularly acute
here, because though the two issues, though drastically different,
are easy to run together. Hamilton argues that the polygamy
harms are readily, and abundantly, framed in neutral, secular
terms: gender inequality, age inequality, frequency of abuse, even
abandonment of male teenagers to reduce competition. As Hamil-
ton notes, the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women urges a ban on po-
lygamy, because of its myriad harmful effects on women.71 The
actual harms to women of the actual practice of polygamy in this
country are clear; there is no need to postulate "speculative"
harms because the practice is so widespread.7" In other words, in
Hamilton's terms, the case against polygamy is cognizable solely
with reference to the public good.73 By contrast, when same-sex
marriage has been tested on those terms, courts have uniformly
found opponents' arguments of social harms to be without merit.
Polygamy, the argument goes, involves people seeking to engage
in activity that does harm third parties, where the objections are
solidly rooted in neutral principles of equality and the public good.
The only sustainable constitutional distinction between gay mar-
riage and polygamy as permissible objects of state regulation is an
empirical one. One of the practices, so the argument must go, is
harmful and unequal, and demonstrably so; the other is not.
American polygamy arose in 19th century Mormonism, and is
practiced today solely by fundamentalist Mormons who demand
the complete subordination of women to men and the forcible mar-
riage of teenage girls to middle-aged and elderly "patriarchs." The
fact, capable of being demonstrated in court, that the actual prac-
tice of polygamy in the U.S. is restricted to such communities, is
relevant to the constitutional analysis. It is a hallmark of "sky is
71. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 74.
72. See, e.g., id. at 73-75; JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 5 (2003).
73. It should be remembered, of course, that the polygamy prohibitions probably were
when enacted precisely the sort of animus-based legislation that would be invalid under
Romer. And the early cases upholding them were rife with the sort of moral disapproval
justifications that are at least questionable (and illegitimate in Kansas) after Lawrence.
However, such laws could be sustained today if a public harm case could be made out that
did not rely on animus or moral disapproval, and there is ample reason to think that this
case is easy to make.
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falling" dissents, like many slippery slope arguments, to elide such
empirical differences and play up superficial similarities. But on
any "public good" jurisprudence such as Hamilton's, the ultimate
test of state regulation will be empirical - can the state put on
real evidence that the regulated practice is harmful to members of
the public? - where the distaste of non-participants is officious
intermeddling only, not harm.74
Religious conservatives who rail at both Boerne and Lawrence
should note the close affinity between RFRA and Lawrence. Un-
der the guise of free exercise and privacy, respectively, each has
had the effect of shielding from state prohibition conduct that
states might otherwise criminalize. It's hard to see how the ag-
grieved believers of Nebraska could throw out John Lawrence's
bathwater without heaving Matthew Koso's baby along with it.
D. Neutrally Applicable Regulations
The United States has many laws regulating the employment
relationship; it also has numerous religious groups, many of which
are also large employers. A broad conception of free exercise will
have the effect of exempting religious employers from most of the
rules that other employers have to follow, and stripping from em-
ployees of religious groups most of the protections other employees
enjoy. Religious groups have for years been vigorously pursuing
this sweeping vision of employment-law exemption in the courts,
and have succeeded to a remarkable degree.
74. Thus in Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211
(2006), for example, the slippery slope from making an exemption for hallucinogenic tea
drunk by 250 members of a Brazilian religion in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to an exemption for
bigamy, which was proposed as a hypothetical by Justice Scalia, is slippery only if con-
ceived of as categorical; it has plenty of footholds if treated as an empirical question of
actual harm.
Justice Scalia: I worry about the general proposition we would be adopting if
we say, you know, one narrow exception is not a - doesn't contravene a com-
pelling State interest. What about - I assume there is still a Federal law
against bigamy that applies in Federal territories. Now, what if, you know, a
small religious group comes forward and said, you know, "We - our religion
requires bigamy. There are not a whole lot of us. We're just a little tiny group.
So, we demand, under RFRA, an exemption from this absolute law. Why does
it have to be absolute? It's just a little tiny exception, only a few of us." ....
Ms. Hollander [counsel for 0 Centro]: Your Honor, the analysis would be the
same .... [he Government could come forward with a compelling interest
[such as] the sanctity of marriage, the other issues. And those would be issues
of fact for a district judge to decide....
0 Centro, No. 04-1084, 2005 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 48, 44-45 (Nov. 1, 2005).
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Here again, it is striking how interconnected Hamilton's doc-
trinal areas are. Consider, for example, the rippling ramifications
of the sex abuse scandal in the Catholic Church. The church is the
biggest religious employer in the country, and the bulk of its em-
ployees are teachers at Catholic schools. Those schools have been
the site of many of the allegations of sexual abuse and coverup -
in particular, claims that priests with histories of abuse reports
have been quietly placed in teaching positions.
A typical case might then go as follows. A church employee
blows the whistle on a coverup - perhaps the church has quietly
placed accused priests in teaching positions at a Catholic college.
The church demotes that employee as punishment. She sues un-
der Title VII, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. The
church now claims immunity under the "ministerial exemption."
This is a judge-made doctrine that holds churches absolutely im-
mune from legal consequences for any employment decisions relat-
ing to their ministers. Title VII does have a provision allowing
churches to use religion as a criterion in hiring ministers. But the
ministerial exemption as courts apply it is not based the narrow
exemption in Title VII. The immunity comes, the cases say, di-
rectly from the First Amendment itself. Ordinary state-law con-
tract claims are barred as well.75 Thus churches enjoy blanket
protection for any employment-law violations by religious organi-
zations, so long as the victims of those violations do religious
work, and no legislature has the power to create remedies for the
employees. It is one thing to allow a Catholic college to hire only
Catholic priests to serve as its chaplains. But suppose the college
then fires one of those chaplains because he reported incidents of
sexual abuse by other priests to the police. Should the college
really be immune from a retaliation suit in those circumstances?
Suppose the college decides to hire only white priests. Is the col-
lege immune from a race-discrimination suit? Suppose the college
hires a nun as a chaplain, and then fires or disciplines her for re-
porting sexual assaults by other college employees. Is the college
immune from suit? Do religious organizations really have cate-
gorical immunity for all employment decisions involving ministe-
rial workers?
75. See David J. Overstreet, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law? A Critical Examina-
tion of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric's Breach of Employment Contract Claim
Against a Religious Institution, 81 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1996).
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These are not fanciful scenarios. My hypothetical - the nun
demoted for reporting church coverups of sexual assaults by
priests - is taken from a recent case, Petruska v. Gannon Univer-
sity."6 Petruska, a nun, was serving as a chaplain at Gannon, a
Catholic college in Pennsylvania, when she made public the col-
lege's quiet hiring of priests with long histories of alleged sexual
abuse, along with patterns of gender discrimination and sexual
harassment. She was demoted and threatened with termination if
she did not take another position within the university. She re-
signed, and sued, alleging retaliation, gender discrimination, and
breach of contract. The college defended itself on jurisdictional
grounds, arguing that once it is determined that the plaintiff
served in a ministerial capacity, the courts have no jurisdiction to
hear any lawsuit stemming from that employment relationship.
This is an extraordinarily broad immunity, covering, inter alia,
contract disputes, discrimination, labor disputes77 - the entire
universe of generally applicable legal protections that employees
can invoke to protect themselves against being wrongfully fired or
disciplined. The district court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear any claims whatsoever having to do with Petruska's employ-
ment at Gannon.
Consider the ramifications of this theory: in the simplest possi-
ble hypothetical, a church could sign a contract with a minister
76. 350 F. Supp. 2d 666 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
77. It may be comical to imagine priests trying to unionize, but consider that Catholic
schools employ hundreds of thousands of teachers at poverty wages with minimal benefits.
Is teaching "ministerial"? In 1979, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
whether the NLRA covered teachers at Catholic schools. The church asserted a blanket
exemption from any exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board. The
Court, by a vote of 5-4, agreed. No governmental inquiry into labor practices at the schools
is acceptable, the Court said, per Chief Justice Burger, because the schools might defend
themselves on the grounds that
their challenged actions were mandated by their religious creeds. The resolu-
tion of such charges by the Board, in many instances, will necessarily involve
inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators
and its relationship to the school's religious mission. It is not only the conclu-
sions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaran-
teed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to
findings and conclusions.
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979). Turning the recently an-
nounced Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), on its
head (and taking an ironic swipe at the recently retired William O. Douglas), Burger noted
that "Mr. Justice Douglas... in his concurring opinion in Lemon, not[ed] 'the admitted and
obvious fact that the raison d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious
faith.'" Id. at 504. What in Lemon had been a reason for barring government funding of
religious schools became in Catholic Bishop a reason for exempting the schools from neu-
trally applicable labor law.
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stating expressly that he is to give two sermons a week for five
weeks, that he is to be paid $100 a sermon, due and payable im-
mediately at the close of each service, and that the church may
terminate the contract at any time with severance pay of half the
amount remaining due. (If he were terminated after five sermons,
in other words, he would get $250 severance.) Absent a broad
minsterial exemption of the kind applied by the district court in
Petruska, the minister could go to court to enforce the contract if,
say, he gives a sermon and is not thereafter paid, or if he is termi-
nated with no severance. That is the protection that the basic,
generally applicable law of contracts provides to everyone; that's
why we sign contracts. But churches have taken to arguing that
where their "ministerial" employees are involved, contract law
simply doesn't apply to them. They are just not bound by what
they agreed to, and their contracts are unenforceable, regardless
- here's the important part - of whether the reason for the
breach was a religious reason or not. Hamilton is right to be wor-
ried about this development.
Zoning laws, too, are the site of exemption claims by religious
groups, as are prison security regulations. Hamilton - who
represents neighborhood homeowners' associations seeking to en-
force zoning restrictions against church expansions"8 - provides a
troubling overview of recent litigation in these areas, litigation
which has been fueled enormously by passage of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").
Zoning and security regulations that would be safe from, or have
prevailed against, constitutional challenge now may be attacked
on federal statutory grounds, as burdening religious practice
without a sufficient showing of state interest.
Once a group has cloaked itself in the mantle of religion, it may
simultaneously claim extraordinary state benefits (e.g., tax-
exempt status) and resist state oversight of its conduct. Hamilton
cites numerous examples of prison gang recruiting and drug deal-
ing carried out under the auspices of provision of religious ser-
vices, often by groups such as the Aryan Brotherhood, a violent
white supremacist gang which recruits nearly all of its members
in prisons." Meaningful screening of prisoners' claims for reli-
gious accommodation, and of organizations providing services and
programs in prisons, would require some sort of criteria for sepa-
78. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 84.
79. See id. at 142-144, 154.
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rating "legitimate" religious groups from "illegitimate" ones, and
those criteria could not avoid some reference to the content of the
groups' doctrine. Scrutiny of doctrinal content is a guaranteed
lawsuit trigger. Prison authorities lack the resources to defend
their regulations against endless RLUIPA litigation, so they often
simply accede to any accommodation request couched in religious
terms. Hamilton provides an extensive list of such accommoda-
tions, from allowing Sikhs to grow beards to providing "Luceferi-
ans" with Bibles and matches for ritual burnings. °
Some of the stories are comical, such as the "Church of the New
Song," which was invented by an enterprising inmate in the 1970s
and successfully procured for itself numerous accommodations,
such as weekly steak dinners. The Church of the New Song was
founded as a "game," but when prison officials called its bluff, the
church prevailed in federal district court81 and then in the Eighth
Circuit, 2 which held that the church "is a religion within the am-
bit of the First Amendment."' The district court, citing Seeger
and Ballard, held that it would not attempt to define "religion"
beause "[i.t is. neither foracourt or a goveinmental official to rule
on the truth or falsity of a religious faith. Such questions are
clearly placed beyond the pale of governmental decision-making
by the First Amendment.' " This is fine reversal-proof rhetoric,
and the Church of the New Song was relatively harmless. But
Hamilton makes a good case that uncritical accommodation has
been disastrous for prison security. Where violence or racial su-
premacy is an integral part of a religious organization's creed,
may the organization invoke the First Amendment to defeat state
efforts to restrict its ministry in prisons? At the moment, says
Hamilton, the answer is almost always "yes." But why should we
take it for granted that the Constitution requires that result?
Why must the Free Exercise Clause be read to run roughshod over
every corner of law and policy?
80. Id. at 157-62.
81. Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
82. Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974).
83. Remmers, 494 F.2d at 1278.
84. Remrners, 361 F. Supp. at 542 (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
and United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
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III. WHO'S OUT TO GET RELIGION?
Michael McConnell, now a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and formerly a University of Chi-
cago law professor, is the best-known advocate of a reading of the
First Amendment that would greatly expand protection for reli-
gious conduct under the Free Exercise Clause while weakening
the "anti-entanglement" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. McConnell's arguments are largely historical, and have
been widely criticized within the legal and historical academies.
Hamilton summarizes and adds to this criticism.' But Hamilton
also points to a deeper problem with McConnell's position: it is
"based on a false assumption that this culture is hostile to relig-
ion."" Special exemptions from neutrally applicable laws may be
thought constitutionally necessary if the legislatures passing
those laws are out to suppress and persecute religious belief.8" But
the idea that any legislatures, from city councils up through the
U.S. Congress, harbor some generalized hostility to religion is, I
agree with Hamilton, laughable.' On the contrary, legislatures
miss no opportunity to trumpet their religiosity and deference to
all things sacred. The Terry Schiavo case was just the most recent
and most degrading example.
Thus the attacks on Smith89 and the justifications for RFRA
were framed in terms of hypotheticals. ° Blanket exemption was
needed, the argument went, because (to take just one example),
states might start firing doctors in public hospitals if they refused
to perform abortions on religious grounds. But of course not only
had that never happened, but the actual legislatures in the actual
country we inhabit were passing laws explicitly providing for ex-
emptions for such doctors. Many states have gone even further,
85. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 219-20, 238-72.
86. Id. at 290.
87. See id. at 292 ("The basic problem with McConnell's analysis is that it assumes that
legislatures are inclined to suppress religious liberty, that religious lobbyists are weak in
the legislative process, and that there are strong lobbies to achieve the anti-religion ends he
cites. In fact, the contrary is true. Religious entities are uncannily able to obtain what they
seek in the legislative context.").
88. The Florida Santeria case, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993), is not to the contrary, I would suggest. Rather than hostility to "religion
itself," I think the case demonstrates the ability, and willingness, of the dominant religion
to use the legislature to suppress a minority religion.
89. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90. See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 289-90.
Winter 2006 253
Duquesne Law Review
passing laws allowing even pharmacists to refuse to dispense birth
control pills if they object on religious grounds to contraception.
But McConnell's arguments dovetailed perfectly with the con-
servative Christian movement's political mobilization strategy,
which relied on convincing its members that they were a weak,
marginalized minority whose values and beliefs were under as-
sault by a dominant secular culture.91 Any failure by the state to
maximally accommodate religious beliefs in the public sphere -
by, for example, not allowing prayers to be read over the public
address system before high school football games" - could be a
talisman of a nationwide campaign to suppress religion entirely.
McConnell has described the supposed modern suppression of re-
ligiosity thus:
Religious freedom is to be protected, strongly protected -
so long as it is irrelevant to the life of the wider commu-
nity. But allow religion to affect the law pertaining to,
say, abortion; or allow religion to affect the way we edu-
cate our children in our communities' schools; even allow
religion to affect the way we celebrate holidays in public,
and there is trouble. When these quaint and discredited
beliefs spill over into the life of the community, we have
crossed the line.9"
But this argument is deceptive; it is founded on equivocation on
two key terms, "public" and "affect." Most Americans would surely
agree that religion is a legitimate part of "the life of the wider
community." But from that proposition, does it necessarily follow
that religious doctrines are a legitimate basis for substantive
criminal law? Saying that criminal laws ought not to be based on
religious doctrines is simply not the same as saying that religion
"has nothing to offer to the public sphere," or that "[wie will not
interfere with solitary hermits in the forest, but they must stay
91. Examples are legion. I will leave it to the reader to consider the prevalence of this
theme in so much of the public discourse as she peruses. A typical example is the Dover,
Pennsylvania "intelligent design" lawsuit, in which an attempt to prevent the public
schools from teaching this religious doctrine in science classes was glossed by one religious
activist as "an attempt to slowly remove every symbol of Christianity and religious faith in
our country." Goodstein, supra note 32, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2005 (quoting Bowie Kuhn,
the chairman of the Thomas More Center, which persuaded the school board to adopt the
intelligent design textbook and is paying its legal costs).
92. See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
93. Michael McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion
in the Post-modern Age, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 163, 165 (1993).
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out of the public square."9" Religion "affects" the decision about
whether to have an abortion every time a person who is opposed to
abortion on religious grounds chooses not to have one, or tries to
persuade others not to have one; and it affects the laws governing
abortion in the numerous restrictions states have imposed on ac-
cess to abortion within the limits of Casey. Those choices, that
debate, and those restrictions, are a loud, obvious, and vital part
of public life. If the current state of affairs is unacceptable to
some religious commentators, it is not because religion has been
shut out of the nation's public discourse about abortion, but rather
because certain denominations are unable to use force to compel
those who disagree with them to obey their particular doctrines.
Likewise, religion profoundly "affects" the way "we educate our
children in our communities' schools" and "the way we celebrate
holidays in public" in so many and such obvious ways that it
would be pointless to begin enumerating them, and absurd to deny
their presence or significance.95 Not that McConnell does; he
doesn't seriously claim that religion has been evicted from public
life. What he actually protests is the inability of religion to dictate
the content of education, or laws, or public celebrations. When
"public square" becomes "criminal code" and "curriculum," and
"affect" becomes "dictate," the argument looks somewhat different,
and somewhat less appealing. Neither McConnell nor the Repub-
lican Party wants to go the voters saying, "Let the dominant reli-
gious sect in your community write the criminal code and your
child's textbooks!" But if that isn't the actual goal, then the cur-
rent state of First Amendment law is not a problem.
If, on the other hand, we look around at our public life and see it
as saturated with religion already, we will be somewhat less in-
94. Id.
95. To take a single, trivial example off the top of my head: As I write this, I look out at
a massive, three-story nativity scene being erected in the plaza attached to the U.S. Steel
building in downtown Pittsburgh. The giant manger is the descendant of a much smaller
nativity scene that had historically been set up in the city courthouse down the street.
After Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the city thought it advisable to discontinue
hosting the manger, and private funds were raised to erect it at the Steel Building. What
had been a small display scarcely visible from the street has become a vast installation
impossible to miss, at the same time as it has gone from "public space" to "private space."
Would McConnell argue that because the plaza is attached to an office building owned by a
corporation, and is thus not on city-owned land, it is not part of "public life" - regardless of
its physical centrality and openness, and the thousands of people who walk through it
every day? And if he would insist that the plaza is actually "private," then it's clear that
'private," for him, does not mean "what solitary hermits do in the forest," and his use of
that metaphor is disingenuous. "Private" and "public" have a variety of meanings, and to
slide between meanings in this way does a disservice to good faith debate.
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clined to insist on further exemptions for religions from the laws
the rest of us have to follow. And we will be even less so to the
extent that we question the claim, ubiquitous in public discourse,
that enhanced religiosity furthers the public good. It's important
to ask whether this is so. Indeed, it may be that the legislatures
have already gone too far in the other direction, and crafted too
many exemptions. The exemptions for doctors and pharmacists,
for example, ought to be rather troubling. Do we really want
pharmacists - who, after all, are licensed and regulated by the
state - to be in the business of deciding which customers are enti-
tled to have their prescriptions filled?" Suppose the exemption
statute specifies that the pharmacist's objection must be a reli-
gious one. Where exactly is the line between gender discrimina-
tion and religious belief if the relevant religious belief is that pre-
marital sex is immoral? A pharmacist claiming an exemption
based on that belief is claiming the right to deny prescriptions to
women, and only to women, based on his disapproval of their con-
duct. Suppose the pharmacist is a Southern Baptist, and adheres
to the Southern Baptist doctrine that a woman sould "s-u-,
gracefully" to the will of her husband. 7 Suppose he refuses to fill
her prescription without evidence of permission from her husband.
Suppose a Southern Baptist doctor, under an equivalent statute,
refuses to perform an abortion without evidence of the husband's
permission. Presumably if the statute allows the doctor to refuse
absolutely, it should allow him to accept conditionally s8 But pre-
cisely such a "spousal notification" provision was invalidated by
96. This issue is far more than theoretical. A number of these exemptions are already
in place, and religious pharmacists are taking advantage of them. And in communities
with few pharmacies, the effect can be to functionally remove contraception from the mar-
ket, at least until a non-objecting pharmacist - assuming one is available - comes on
duty. For women seeking emergency contraception, for example following a rape, time is of
the essence. An Arizona pharmacist, for example, recently refused to dispense emergency
contraception to a rape victim, sparking demonstrations outside the pharmacy. See David
Schultz, Pharmacists Don't Have a Right To Deny, ARIZONA DAILY WILDCAT, Nov. 3, 2005.
97. The "Baptist Faith and Message," which is the defining document of the Southern
Baptist Convention, provides at Article XVIII, "The Family," that "[tihe marriage relation-
ship models the way God relates to His people. A husband is to love his wife as Christ
loved the church. He has the God-given responsibility to provide for, to protect, and to lead
his family. A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband
even as the church willingly submits itself to the headship of Christ." The Southern Bap-
tist Convention, The Baptist Faith and Message, available at
http://www.sbc.netfbfm/bfin2000.asp#xviii.
98. To my knowledge, this issue has not been tested in the courts, and it is doubtful
that it will be; doctors taking advantage of the exemption typically do not want to perform
abortions, period.
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the Court in Casey.99 Can states evade Casey simply by turning
over to individual doctors the power to insist on notification?
One might, from this perspective, respond to McConnell's hypo-
thetical parade of horribles by asking why they are so horrible.
Why, at the end of the day, would it be a bad thing for a state hos-
pital to fire a doctor who refused, on religious grounds, to perform
a medically indicated, legal abortion? The state hired the doctor
to practice medicine, after all: if the doctor finds the practice of
medicine to be immoral, he is free to find another line of work; and
if he doesn't like the terms of employment at the hospital, he is
free to work elsewhere. There are plenty of religious hospitals at
which no doctor may perform an abortion, even if he deems it
medically necessary.
What about religious beliefs that are openly discriminatory?
Could a doctor refuse to treat a child of an interracial couple be-
cause he devoutly believed that miscegenation violated God's law?
And why would it be a bad thing for a public school to fire a gym
teacher who refused to allow girls on the field because of the "im-
modest attire" provided for p.e. class, no matter how sincere the
religious belief that motivated his refusal? °° Could a devout fire-
man refuse to respond to a natural disaster because he sincerely
believed it to be a sign that the Second Coming was upon us and
thus that only the ungodly would be affected? If you think these
examples are fanciful, how will you distinguish them from the
pharmacist exemption? It's impossible, I suggest, to conceive of a
limiting principle that will prevent such "exemptions" from swal-
lowing all aspects of professional life that anyone can articulate a
religious reason for preferring to avoid.01 Can it really be the case
that the Free Exercise Clause requires employers to create two job
categories: one for secular employees, who must do all the work
the job requires, and another for religious employees, who must do
only as much work as they approve of on religious grounds? The
Constitution does not grant to religious believers the right to de-
mand that the social environment around them be restructured to
conform to their beliefs.
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992).
100. See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 138-39.





Hamilton's bailiwick is attempts by religious entities to secure
blanket constitutional immunity for incontestably bad acts.' 2 And
for such cases - which undoubtedly make up the vast bulk of the
God-versus-gavel docket - little philosophical reflection is re-
quired. If the Catholic Church, for example, seeks to defend
against a tort suit alleging sexual abuse by claiming absolute im-
munity for all priest-parishoner interactions, 3 then the lines are
squarely drawn. The solution Hamilton proposes - application of
neutral laws governing conduct to all actions, religious or other-
wise - is one I heartily endorse. But in some cases the lines are
less clear, and the legal and philosophical issues much more trou-
blingly gray. These cases include the ones I began with and will
now end with: murder.0 . defendants who plead insanity based on
their religious beliefs.
A. The Deific Decree Defense: Deanna Laney
On May 10, 2003, in Tyler, Texas, Deanna Laney killed two of
her children, and attempted to kill the third, by bludgeoning them
on the head with large rocks. ' Laney was a married mother of
three who home-schooled her children, did not work outside the
home, and had little contact with the community outside her
church, the First Assembly of God, where her brother-in-law was
pastor. The coming apocalypse, with its widespread cataclysms,
death, destruction, and judgment, was a frequent subject of ser-
mons at the church, as was the possibility that God would call on
102. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 274 ("The hard question.., is when, if ever, a
religious individual or institution should be given freedom from the general law.").
103. Or, as in the case of several Dioceses which have declared bankruptcy, challenged
bankruptcy proceedings against their assets as violations of free exercise. See, e.g., Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Tort Claimants Committee at 1-2, Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirito, No. 04-
1084 (discussing In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon, Case No. 04-37154-ELP1l and In re Catholic
Bishop of Spokane, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washing-
ton, Case No. 04-08822-PCW1 1).
104. And of course, as in the Elizabeth Smart case, rape and kidnapping. See supra note
7.
105. For reporting on the Laney case, see Mark Collette, Case Could Add Fuel to Insan-
ity Debate, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2004; Lisa Falkenberg, Mother Insane
When She Killed Sons, THE ADVERTISER, Apr. 5, 2004, at 25; Lee Hancock, Laney Told of
Devil and Wanting To Die, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 9, 2004 at 1A; E.G. Morris, Civil
Commitment vs. Life in Prison: What Andrea Yates Knew That Deanna Laney Didn't, TEXAS
LAWYER, April 12, 2004 at 27; CourtTV, Texas Jury Deciding Fate of Mother Who Stoned
Sons, available at httpJ/www.courttv.com/trials/laney.
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the faithful to perform services for him in the coming end times.
On several occasions in the months before she killed her children,
Laney told other church members that she was experiencing di-
vine revelations, that God was calling her to do the work neces-
sary to prepare for the Second Coming. These reports did not
cause alarm in the church community or her family; °6 such ex-
periences were fairly common, and pentecostalism stresses both a
personal, communicative relationship with God, and a narrative of
the coming judgment with its widespread upheavals. Adherence
to God's commands, the church teaches, is the only route to salva-
tion. Obedience to God is the defining quality of a good Christian,
and is necessary for salvation. Any deviation from God's com-
mands will result in damnation. Thus religious groups such as
Laney's church often counsel home-schooling and other forms of
separation from society for their adherents: God's commands are
the source of all morality, and may apply to contemporary social
and political life in many ways. Disobedience in any form will
bring damnation. 7
On the morning of the murders, Laney told investigators, she
heard God's voice in the sky commanding her to sacrifice her chil-
dren. It was the final test before the apocalypse. If she passed, she
would be given an important part to play in the Second Coming,
and would then be reunited with her children when the righteous
were saved and the unrighteous damned. This was a hard order
to follow, she said, but because she "had been taught that you obey
God," she brought her two older boys one by one to the back yard
and smashed their heads with a large rock, killing them. She then
tried to do the same to her youngest son, who was in his crib, but
she was unable to complete the act, and the infant was left alive
and severely brain-damaged. Immediately after the killings,
Laney said, she heard thunder and saw a flash in the sky;
throughout the day, she had seen signs to which she gave Biblical
interpretations.
106. Laney's husband testified, for example, that he had seen no evidence of unusual
behavior of any sort by his wife prior to the killings. See KLTV News, Deanna Laney's
Husband Testifies, (KLTV News broadcast, Mar. 29, 2004) (footage of Keith Laney's testi-
mony) ("Prosecutor: Did you ever see anything in her behavior that would have led you to
believe that this would happen? Laney: Never.").
107. An accessible introduction to evangelical culture in the U.S. is the Columbia relig-
ion scholar Randall Balmer's Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangeli-
cal Subculture in America (1993).
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At trial, Laney pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. She
adduced the auditory hallucination she experienced - the voice
commanding her to commit the murders - as evidence that she
was delusional at the time of the murders, and argued that her
delusion prevented her from understanding that her act was
wrong: if God's commands are the source of morality, then if God
orders an act, how can it be wrong? All five psychiatrists who ex-
amined her (three for the defense, one for the state, and one for
the court) concurred in pronouncing her mentally ill, though she
had no history of mental illness, and the jury found her not guilty
by reason of insanity. She was committed to a state mental hospi-
tal.
Laney was found to be legally insane on the basis of her belief
that God ordered her to commit the murder. Unlike many killers,
Laney explained herself clearly and forthrightly. She was person-
ally called by God to kill her children as a test of faith. God ex-
plaimed that the end times were upon us, that Laney must demon-
strate her faith if she wanted to be saved, and that she would be
reunited with her children in heaven, if she passed the test. The
message from God that she described constituted the primary evi-
dence that at the time of the murders she was legally insane.
Whatever else the case may have been about, then - postpartum
depression, or husbands' subjugation of wives, for example - it is,
unquestionably, a case about religion.
Laney, a devout fundamentalist for whom religion was the driv-
ing force in her life,"°8 described the murders as a test of faith. 9
The centrality of tests of faith to the Christian tradition is rele-
vant to the legal analysis of Laney's insanity defense. The legal
test for insanity in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions, including Texas,
108. Lee Hancock, Laney Told of Devil and Wanting to Die, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 9, 2004, at 1A (reporting that Laney "home-schooled her children and rarely left Smith
County, and her friends and family are lifelong members of a Pentecostal church."); Kill
Her! Scream the E-Mails, YEARBOOK OF EXPERTS, AUTHORITIES, AND SPOKESPERSONS, June
7, 2004 (quoting Dr. Patricia Farrell describing Laney as "isolated.").
109. Hancock, supra note 105 (quoting Laney as saying, in her videotaped interview
with psychiatrists which was played at trial, "I didn't want to kill my kids at all... I felt
like I had no choice... Because God told me to do that, and I was taught you obey God.");
E.G. Morris, Civil Commitment vs. Life in Prison: What Andrea Yates Knew That Deanna
Laney Didn't, TEXAS LAWYER, April 12, 2004 at 27 (reporting that "psychiatrists testified
that Laney's severe mental illness caused her to believe that God had chosen her to kill her
children as a test of faith."); Jan Jarboe Russell, Mental Illness Can Hide Behind the Mask
of Religion, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Apr. 10, 2004 (reporting that
Laney's attorney described Laney's choice as follows: "Does she follow what she believed to
be God's will, or does she turn her back on God?").
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requires that because of a mental disease or defect the defendant
did not know that her act was wrong." A "delusional" belief can
constitute mental disease or defect."' It is easy to see how a case
like Laney's could raise difficult philosophical and constitutional
questions, most obviously: "If the defendant believes that God or-
dered her to kill her children, how does that belief affect her
knowledge that doing so is wrong?" and "Can a court constitution-
ally find that a religious belief is an insane delusion?" Such ques-
tions are occasionally addressed by courts, but rarely - and rarely
well"' - and trial judges are extremely hesitant to instruct juries
on such matters.1"
The meaning of "wrong," like the meanings of the other terms in
the test, is subject to much dispute,"' but at the very least, if a
defendant on her own terms understood the wrongness of her act
at the time she acted, she would not state an insanity defense.
Test-of-faith delusions would appear to present just such facts: the
believer's knowledge that the commanded act is wrong is inherent
in the belief that he is facing a test of faith. Laney is a paradig-
110. Tex. Pen. Code § 8.01 (a) ("It is an afffimative defense to prosecution that, at the
time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not
know that his conduct was wrong."); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 877 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994). This test derives from an English case, M'Naughten, and is often referred to by that
name. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
111. See Coffee v. State, 184 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945).
112. The most widely discussed deific decree case, People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949
(N.Y. 1915) was authored by then-Judge Cardozo. The opinion, though, has been sharply
criticized on a variety of grounds, not least as creating "pseudo-doctrine," insofar as Car-
dozo's putative legal holding on the meaning of 'wrong" for purposes of the insanity defense
was based not on the facts of the case, but on a deific decree hypothetical he invented him-
self. See, e.g., Christopher Hawthorne, Deific Decree: The Short but Happy Life of a Pseudo-
Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1775-80 (2000). Hawthorne also criticizes deific decree
as internally inconsistent, unworkable, and outdated, and others have called it outright
unconstitutional. Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, "God Told Me To Kill': Religion or
Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 1022 ("Although society may wish to characterize the
deific decree belief as absurd or false, it cannot, consistent with our Constitution, do so.").
113. As for instance in Laney, where the trial judge did not define wrong, and Bigby,
which had stated explicitly that the insanity defense is as a matter of law not available for
a defendant who argues that "regardless of society's views about his illegal act and his
understanding that it was illegal, under his 'moral' code it was permissible," Bigby, 892
S.W.2d at 878 - a holding which would seem to rule out most deific decree claims - was
never brought up. See Telephone interview with Buck Files, Laney's attorney, Nov. 15,
2004. Asked whether either side had requested such an instruction, Files laughed and
replied, "No trial judge in his right mind is going to define 'Wrong.'" Id.
114. See, e.g, Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; State v. Corley, 495 P.2d 470, 473 (Ariz. 1972);
State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1322 (N.J. 1990); WAYNE LA FAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 7.2; Bageshree V. Ranade, Comment, Conceptual Ambiguities in the Insanity De-
fense: State v. Wilson and the New 'Wrongfulness" Standard, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1384-
86(1998).
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matic test-of-faith killer. She took the test - "follow what [you]
believ[e] to be God's will, or... turn [your] back on God?""5 - and,
by its terms, passed: she did what God instructed, and did not
turn her back on God's command, even at the cost of her sons'
lives. Whatever psychiatrists may say about the mental state of a
person who makes such a choice, there is no denying, on the facts
of Laney's case, that she understood that she was being asked to
do a difficult act - difficult precisely because it was condemned as
wrong by the moral rules Laney would normally follow, and the
prevailing moral rules of her community. To say that somehow
she failed to understand that the killings were "wrong" is precisely
to trivialize, to misunderstand, the religious act, the act of faith,
that she performed. The voice in the sky commanded Laney to kill
that which she loved,"6 and she obeyed, not because she
loved her sons less, but to prove that her devotion to God was ab-
solute.
117
115. Russell, supra note 109 (quoting Laney's attorney describing her choice at trial).
116. Cf. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING 100 (Alstair Hannay trans., Pen-
guin Books 1985) (1843). Abraham "must love [Isaac] with all his soul. When God asks for
Isaac, Abraham must if possible love him even more, and only then can he sacrifice him; for
it is indeed this love of Isaac that in its paradoxical opposition to his love of God makes his
act a sacrifice." The point, in other words, is that there would be no test, no faith, no su-
preme act of religious devotion, if in any way Abraham or Laney were unaware of the terri-
ble wrongness, inhumanity, self-negation, and brutality of what they were commanded to
do.
117. Cf the whole history of religious fundamentalism. Here are three recent examples,
one from each of the three Abrahamic religions.
Mustafa Jabbar says he and his wife stand ready to be martyrs for Mr. Sadr's
movement. If need be, he said, they will volunteer their first born as well, a
baby boy, now 45 days old. "I will put mines in the baby and blow him up," Mr.
Jabbar said. He has named the baby Moktada.
Somini Sengupta, In the Ancient Streets of Najaf, Pledges of Martyrdom for Cleric, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2004, at A3 (reporting interview with Iraqi Shiite Muslim parents).
I raised the question of whether Jewish parents who place their children
within range of Palestinian rockets had their priorities in order. Exasperated,
Rachel said, "If I believe in holy law, that the commandment of the land of Is-
rael is a commandment of God, and I want my children to be raised as Jews, I
have to take them where they're going to fulfill this mitzvah. I have to take my
child and physically he has to settle the land with me. I can't say I won't do
things because I don't want him to suffer."
Saperstein said, "If I believed that if all the settlers disappeared tomorrow
then peace and happiness would reign forever, that we could live in peace as
Jews in what's left of our homeland, then I would seriously consider picking up
and going somewhere else."
Rachel looked at her husband.
"I wouldn't," she said.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Among the Settlers, NEW YORKER, May 31, 2004, at 54 (reporting inter-
view with Israeli Jewish parents).
In April 1999, [Michelle] Mingo wrote: "Our main desire should be for God's
purposes not Samuel's discomfort. We put Samuel in God's hands and leave
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B. Delusion and the First Amendment
Taking Laney at her word, then, is her belief a "delusion"? Un-
der Texas law, as in most states, an insane delusion is a belief
which is both false in fact, and which no rational person would
ever believe."'
Under the First Amendment, however, courts may not declare
any religious beliefs to be false. The leading case is United States
v. Ballard."' In Ballard, the Court reversed the conviction of a
religious organization under mail fraud statutes which were di-
rected at "false" statements used to solicit funds. The Court rea-
soned that religious claims could not fall within the reach of the
statute because this would be require courts to make judgments
about the truth or falsity of such claims, which would violate the
First Amendment. The Court held that the Constitution forbids
submission to the jury of:
the truth or verity of ... religious doctrines or beliefs...
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not
be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.
[The] miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of
Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in
the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to
jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious
freedom. 2 °
Laney presents the converse scenario: she was spared jail be-
cause a jury in a sympathetic environment accepted a defense the-
ory requiring a finding that her beliefs were false. But the legal
issue presented is the same: both results offend the Constitution.
him there. What can we do for Samuel? NOTHING! God is the master. We
are his servants." Later that month, Mingo wrote: "We learned how to give
Samuel into God's hand. Karen had to learn to receive correction from whoever
the Lord chooses."
John Ellement, Woman Admits Role in Child's Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2004, at B1
(quoting a journal kept by Michelle Mingo, a member of a American fundamentalist Chris-
tian sect, who claimed that God had ordered that solid food should be withheld from her 9-
month old nephew Samuel; Samuel's parents complied, and Samuel subsequently starved
to death).
118. Knight v. Edwards, 264 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. 1954) ("The courts of this state have
defined the term 'insane delusion' as being 'the belief of a state of supposed facts that do not
exist, and which no rational person would believe.'").
119. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
120. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
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If courts cannot declare any religious beliefs to be false, then a
fortiori, they cannot declare any religious beliefs to be insane de-
lusions, beliefs so bizarre that no rational person could entertain
them. The paths of the psychiatrist and the judge diverge. The
psychiatrist may be inclined to diagnose as schizophrenic a person
who is convinced that God is talking to him and giving him in-
structions for his mission when the apocalypse comes, even where
the person's beliefs are squarely in line with the teachings of his
church and mainstream beliefs in his community.'21 But a court
cannot constitutionally enter an NGRI judgment based on those
delusions. 122
Consider, for example, what the appellate courts would be faced
with if Laney had been convicted, and then appealed on the
grounds that the conviction was insufficiently supported by the
evidence. The question of law the appellate court would have to
resolve is whether a reasonable jury could have found that Laney
was sane on the record presented. If the appellate court reversed
on this issue, it would have to find that based on the evidence pre-
sented, no reasonable jury could have failed to find that Laney's
religious beliefs were insane delusions - that as a matter of law,
Laney's religious beliefs were both false in fact and so absurd that
no rational person could believe them. Henceforth, then, the defi-
nition of "delusion" in the Texas Criminal Code would encompass
religious beliefs just as surely as did the challenged statute in Bal-
lard. In both cases, a court must make the determination that the
given proposition is false.
The Laney scenario is, of course, speculative. But the Kelley
case in Tennessee produced just such an appellate result.22 On
August 14, 1999, Brian Kelley, a married church deacon with no
history of mental illness, smothered his thirteen month-old daugh-
121. Though the diagnosis would likely conflict with the psychiatric profession's own
published diagnostic criteria as given in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM-IV").
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 765 (4th ed. 1994) (defining "delusion" as "a false belief based on incorrect infer-
ence about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else be-
lieves and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture
or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith)."). See Grant H. Morris & Ansar
Haroun, "God Told Me To Kill": Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2000)
(arguing that the DSM definition of delusion is incompatible with the deific decree defense).
122. See, e.g., Morris & Haroun, supra note 121, at 1022 ("Although society may wish to
characterize the deific decree belief as absurd or false, it cannot, consistent with our Con-
stitution, do so.").
123. See State v. Kelley, 2002 WL 927610 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2002).
Vol. 44264
Winter 2006 Faith, Harm, and Neutrality
ter Erin, after "receiv[ing] visions of the biblical characters Abra-
ham and Isaac," in which God gave him "instructions to sacrifice
his daughter because she was 'perfect." 4 Kelley interpreted his
actions to the detective who interrogated him as follows: "Oh, yes,
sir. What I did, according to the laws of this country, yes, sir, it
was wrong. But I don't go by the laws of this land, I go by the
laws of God."'25 At trial, Kelley pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity.26 As the evidence of his insanity, he adduced his belief
that he had killed his daughter at God's command "to pave the
way for Christ's second coming."127 On the basis of that belief, four
psychiatrists testified that he was mentally ill.'28 The jury con-
victed nonetheless, and Kelley appealed his conviction on the
grounds that no reasonable jury could fail to find that he met the
NGRI criteria. The appellate court,while affirming the conviction
on the ground that the evidence supported the jury's finding that
he knew his act was wrong, agreed with Kelley as to the first con-
dition: that he was in fact suffering from a mental disease or de-
fect, and further, that no reasonable jury could have found other-
wise. And the sole evidence for that mental disease or defect were
Kelley's beliefs about God, the apocalypse, and the second coming
of Christ. Thus in Kelley a court held as a matter of law that par-
ticular religious beliefs are false.'29
124. Kelley, 2002 WL 927610, at *5.
125. Id. at *6. The detective testified that Kelley "appeared alert and able to comprehend
was was going on during the interview." Id.
126. Id. at*1.
127. Id. at *18-22.
128. Id. at *22.
129. The court could have narrowed its ruling by holding simply that as a matter of law
a religious belief is not a mental disease or defect, and that Kelley therefore failed to meet
the first M'Naughten prong. The court's ruling, by contrast, paves the way not only for
reversal of convictions on similar facts, but also for collateral consequences perhaps unan-
ticipated by the court. Suppose, for instance, that there was another child in the family,
and that it was uncontroverted that Kelley's wife had precisely the same religious beliefs as
did Kelley. Suppose that other relatives, or the state, sought to remove the surviving child
from the wife's custody on grounds that she was not mentally competent to raise the child,
or to have her committed on grounds that she was mentally ill and dangerous. She would
not - probably - be estopped from arguing in opposition that her beliefs are not insane,
but it would be a hard argument to win if the state, or the relatives, could rely on the appel-
late court's ruling to argue that as a matter of law in Tennessee, her beliefs are insane
delusions. And given Kelley's crime, the dangerousness prong would not be difficult to
make out.
This hypothetical in fact describes the situation in the Laney family, absent the
custody action. There is a surviving child, and, so far as can be ascertained from published
accounts, Laney's husband shares, in all relevant respects, her religious beliefs. If Laney
had been convicted and prevailed on appeal - on at least the mental disease issue, as in
Kelley - then the state of Texas would have precedent for the claim that as a matter of
265
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Under the Ballard line of cases, this result cannot stand, and, I
submit, would fall if the issue is ever squarely presented to the
Supreme Court.13 Does this mean that some people who are "ob-
jectively" (i.e. in the eyes of examining doctors) mentally ill may
face criminal sentences for their acts? Indeed it does, where the
"objectively delusional" beliefs are religious beliefs. That is the
price we pay for the First Amendment. And it is a worthwhile
tradeoff: the cost, on the one hand, is that religiously motivated
killers will be sent to prisons, not hospitals; the benefit, on the
other, is that all religious doctrines will be on an equal legal foot-
ing: the authority and imprimatur of the state will never be lent to
a declaration that someone's religious beliefs are false. I suspect
that Laney's coreligionists would welcome such a tradeoff. It is
the only doctrine, after all, which respects the notion of religious
belief as embodying fundamental choices made by individuals,
choices which are foundational to their sense of self. To permit a
religious belief to be judicially declared an insane delusion, factu-
ally false and so outlandish that no rational person could believe
it, is to demean, trivialize, and chill a central part of many Ameri-
cans' lives.
Further, seen from Hamilton's perspective - that is, analyzing
these defenses as religious exemptions from neutrally applicable
laws - the delusion argument creates a defense which is only
available to people who belong to religions with bloodthirsty gods.
That's a preference pretty clearly at odds with the Establishment
Clause. An interpretation of state NGRI laws that permits a
M'Naughten defense on grounds of divine command is thus uncon-
stitutional insofar as it grants a special privilege to adherents of
Judeo-Christian religions, a privilege not available to adherents of
nonviolent religions or to the nonreligious.
C. Religion and Mens Rea: Jacques Robidoux
Defendants may appeal to religious beliefs to negate an element
of the charged crime even when not pleading insanity. Most seri-
ous crimes require a mens rea of purpose, and a defendant may
law, the teachings of the First Assembly of God are insane delusions. The members of that
church should ask themselves whether Laney's acquittal was worth it.
130. I doubt that it will be, for a wide variety of reasons, particularly the state's inability
to appeal acquittals. And if a case squarely presenting this issue did arise, an alternative,
of course, would be to narrow or reject Ballard. Goldstein, supra note 13, argues that Bal-
lard is routinely - and necessarily - honored in the breach already in many contexts.
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defend on that element by invoking his religious beliefs to argue
that he had no intention of harming the victim. However, just as
religious beliefs are not as a matter of law delusions, neither
should they negate mens rea when knowledge or intent are at is-
sue in non-insanity contexts. The Robidoux case is a good exam-
ple. Jacques Robidoux purposely deprived his son Samuel of solid
food and forced his wife Karen to nurse Samuel while she was
pregnant and confined to a restrictive diet. Jacques and the other
members of his group - called "The Body" - including his sister
Michelle, who first conceived of the idea and reported it as a di-
vine revelation, knew that nursing would not provide Samuel suf-
ficient nutrition. They then watched him starve to death over
fifty-one days. Nonetheless, Jacques, when charged with first de-
gree murder, claimed in his defense that he did not intend to
cause Samuel's death, because he believed that God would "mi-
raculously" save Samuel.
It is important to recognize the specific beliefs asserted by
Jacques and the others who killed Samuel. They believed, first,
that their actions were sufficient to cause his death given the re-
alities of physiology as they understood them. Such belief would
appear to meet the intent requirement for murder: ordinarily, a
defendant who deprives a victim of food, maintains vigilance and
control over the victim to ensure that no one else provides the vic-
tim with food, and understands that food is required for life, is
guilty of murder. Jacques, however, while admitting those acts,
claimed that because he believed God would miraculously inter-
vene, he lacked both intent to kill and knowledge that his acts
would kill. The jury found him guilty. The state did not rebut
Jacques' testimony about his belief that God would intervene, or
allege that the belief was insincere."' The guilty verdict thus indi-
cates that the jury found Jacques' belief irrelevant: the law must
hold people to a standard of rationality that excludes from causal
explanation miraculous divine intervention. People are of course
free to hold such beliefs, but they will not negate scienter which is
otherwise proved. A person may no more starve his son and hope
that God will intervene than he may fire a gun at his son, hoping
God will deflect the bullet.
Is this what the jury was saying? Juries, of course, typically
don't say anything besides their verdict, and as a legal matter
131. See Dateline, NBC News, May 16, 2004, for an account of prosecutor's argument at
trial. As one juror put it, "he loved his son, he just loved God more."
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they don't have to give reasons. But it's worth asking: did the Ro-
bidoux jury in effect find that Jacques's religious beliefs were
false? Certainly the specific belief that God would intervene and
prevent Samuel's death did in fact turn out to be false: Samuel
died, and God did not prevent the death. But a reasonable belief
would have negated mens rea even for a father who watched his
son die over several months. A father, for instance, who thought
his son had a lingering but non-fatal disease such as mononucleo-
sis or Lyme disease, when in fact the son was dying of some other
disease, treatable but undiagnosed, would not be guilty of murder
if he had reason to believe that his actions would not cause his
son's death. A father who received an initial erroneous diagnosis
from a doctor, for example, and did not seek a second opinion
would probably not be guilty of any crime. A father who did not
seek any medical advice, but relied in good faith on his own and
family members' experience (in a way roughly analogous to the
Robidoux family's group affirmation of the starvation of Samuel)
would be a more ambiguous case and would depend on the jury's
evaluation of the competence and reasonableness of the father's
and the family's decisions. In such cases, however, the parent is
rarely charged with murder, especially given the availability of
child neglect laws.'32 The crucial element in the Robidoux case is
that there was no doubt among the family members as to the
physical cause of Samuel's decline and death - starvation - and
no doubt as to the available remedy for his condition - feeding
him. "'33 The Robidoux verdict is best seen as a statement that be-
lief in divine intervention is never sufficient grounds for actions
that the actor knows will result, absent divine intervention, in
harm to others. The criminal justice system cannot recognize "the
strength of the absurd" as a defense.'
132. See, e.g., Zaven T. Saroyan, Spiritual Healing and the Free Exercise Clause: An
Argument for the Use of Strict Scrutiny, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 363, 367 (2003) (discussing
charging options when parents refuse to provide needed medical care for children on reli-
gious grounds).
133. Indeed, Reynolds itself - perhaps the earliest and clearest statement from the
Court on the relationship of religious belief to mens rea - uses Robidoux-type facts as a
hypothetical: "In Regina v. Wagstaff (10 Cox Crim. Cases, 531), the parents of a sick child,
who omitted to call in medical attendance because of their religious belief that what they
did for its cure would be effective, were held not to be guilty of manslaughter, while it was
said the contrary would have been the result if the child had actually been starved to death
by the parents, under the notion that it was their religious duty to abstain from giving it
food." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (citing Regina v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox Crim. Cases 531).
134. Cf. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 116, at 75, describing the knight of faith as defined by
his ability to believe "on the strength of the absurd":
268 Vol. 44
Faith, Harm, and Neutrality
A person's belief that his acts will not in fact produce the effect
that he understands would be produced absent divine intervention
is of the same species, for purposes of mens rea, as a person's be-
lief that the moral value of his act which he understands would
obtain absent divine intervention (i.e. sanction or command) does
not apply because of that intervention. Belief that an act is not
wrong is not per se a defense.135 It is relevant only when the de-
fendant pleads insanity, and in that case the defendant must show
not just that she believed her act to be right, but that her belief
was produced by a mental disease or defect which rendered her
incapable of knowing (or "appreciating," depending on the jurisdic-
tion) that the act was wrong. Neither the defect in itself, nor the
(lack of) belief in itself will suffice, nor will both suffice if the latter
is not causally traceable to the former. A concededly mentally ill
defendant cannot win an NGRI acquittal unless his mental illness
produces the required cognitive effects relative to the act he com-
mitted.
Suppose Laney had defended herself on grounds similar to those
raised by Agamemnon in the death of Iphigenia: God's wrath
would have been terrible, and if the children had not been killed,
many more people would have died. This defense would implicate
precisely the same questions as those faced by the Robidoux jury.
Here the defense is justification, rather than lack of intent, but
the analysis is the same. If the act was reasonably calculated to
prevent a greater evil, then it may have been justified. Thus
community norms make all the difference: in a community in
which belief in victim-demanding, wrathful gods is dominant,
child sacrifice, if done sincerely, in circumstances deemed pressing
by the community, would be justified."3 6 Laney's actual defense,
however, and the verdict, is precisely the converse of that sce-
[H]e is reconciled in pain; but then comes the marvel, he makes one more
movement, more wonderful than anything else, for he says: "I nevertheless be-
lieve that I shall get her, namely on the strength of the absurd, on the strength
of the fact that for God all things are possible."
135. A defendant may argue that his act prevented a greater evil, but he will be required
to establish not just his belief in that prevention, but also the reasonableness of his belief,
for example the fact of the prevention. Cf. Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (the
famous case of the shipwrecked and finally cannibalistic sailors - but did they really need
to kill and eat the cabin boy?). And such a defense, in any case, does not assert that the
defendant lacked scienter in performing the act (i.e. did not understand that the act was
legally wrong, or that it was, abstracted from circumstances, morally wrong); rather it
asserts that under the circumstances, the act - judged by the prevailing moral norms of
the community - was in fact justified.
136. And thus not insane; see, e.g., Morris & Haroun, supra note 121, at 1040.
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nario: the jury found that her beliefs were so unreasonable as to
constitute insanity.
What if she had defended herself as Jacques Robidoux did, and
instead of pleading insanity, alleged that while she did swing the
rocks at her sons' heads, she believed that God would miracu-
lously prevent or reverse the fatal damage, and thus that she
lacked knowledge and intent? And what if Jacques Robidoux had
pleaded insanity? The facts of Samuel's death would seem to fit
deific decree doctrine quite well. Indeed Jacques's defense could
be seen as essentially an invocation of the deific decree doctrine.
We might parse it in those terms as follows: because Jacques be-
lieved that his acts were done at the direct command of God, he
could not know that they were wrong. And this defense would be
available even if Jacques did not believe that God would intervene
to save Samuel - if he believed, in other words, that God had
simply ordered him to starve his son to death.
Should there be a legal distinction between a defendant who be-
lieves that God ordered him to starve his son and believes that the
child will die, and one who believes that God ordered him to starve
his son, but believes that God will miraculously prevent death?
The two defendants perform the same act (denying their children
food) and there seems to be little or no distinction in terms of dan-
gerousness. Consider Defendant A, for example, who fires a gun
at his child believing that God will deflect the bullet, and Defen-
dant B, who fires a gun at his child believing that God demands a
sacrifice. Is there a difference in dangerousness? Suppose each
defendant had an auditory hallucination in which a voice from the
heavens commanded him to fire. Suppose further that each un-
derstood at the time of the act that murder is condemned by law
and community norms. Should there be a difference in their re-
spective M'Naughten analyses? Note that the relevant beliefs for
purposes of the M'Naughten "wrong" prong are different: while
both A and B lack knowledge, ex hypothesi, that their acts are
wrong, A lacks that knowledge because he doesn't think his act
will result in the death of his child, while B lacks that knowledge
because he can't see God's commands as wrong. B intends and
believes that his act will result in the death of his child; A does
not. Perhaps A believes that what B did is horribly wrong, while B
believes that what A did is stupid and naive. Should they be
treated the same?
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A and B may be equally dangerous, but the criminal law does
not reach dangerousness per se. 3 7 Criminal punishment requires
mens rea. What is A's mens rea (assuming we believe his testi-
mony)? It wasn't his purpose to cause his child's death. He didn't
believe that his child would die. Was he perhaps reckless, then?
Did he knowingly disregard a substantial risk that his actions
would kill his child? Here again religious belief interjects itself:
How could there be any risk, if God was going to intervene? And
how could A knowingly disregard it, if he believed with all his
heart, with the faith of a good Christian, that God was going to
intervene? To find that A knowingly disregarded the substantial
risk that God would not intervene, the jury would have to assume
- really, to insist - that A actually harbored doubts about God's
power, authenticity, or beneficence, that despite his professions of
faith, A is secretly an agnostic, at least when it comes to miracles.
But on what grounds could the jury make such a finding? In cases
like Laney and Robidoux, there are none. There was simply no
suggestion that the defendants did not sincerely believe what they
said they believed.
This leaves negligence: A should have known that his actions
would kill his child; any reasonable person would have known; A's
beliefs were not reasonable. A, in other words, should have been a
secret agnostic. This analysis is at least plausible on the facts; the
jury could find that A's beliefs were sincere, and simply require, as
a matter of law, that he refrain from acting on such beliefs on pain
of criminal punishment.'38 But negligence will support negligent
homicide only,'39 not first degree murder.
B, on the other hand, demonstrates purpose and premeditation.
B fully intends to cause his child's death. At first glance, then,
one would be inclined to say that B is more culpable; certainly one
would be inclined to say that a cognitive deficiency definition of
137. For example, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may only be confined as
long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992) (holding that the state may not confine even a concededly dangerous NGRI acquittee
once he is found to be sane).
138. As a constitutional principle, such social insistence makes sense: a secular society
of any sort requires a substantive criminal law that does not recognize religious exceptions
to criminal prohibitions. Obviously free exercise and establishment values are in deep
tension here.
139. Not all jurisdictions recognize negligent homicide; it is therefore conceivable that a
defendant in such a jurisdiction, found to have killed negligently, would not be guilty of any
crime, if there was no separate underlying criminal act (e.g. drunk driving).
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legal insanity is more straightforwardly applicable to A (who did
not believe that he was killing his child) than to B (who did).
But A, of course, is Jacques Robidoux, and B is Deanna Laney.
Their respective juries found Robidoux to be a murderer, and
Laney to be insane. It's true that Jacques didn't plead insanity,
but as I've indicated, the questions the jury had to answer in each
case virtually identical: Jacques's defense, that he lacked the in-
tent to kill or the knowledge that he was killing, would equally
suffice for an insanity acquittal if that lack was caused by a men-
tal disease or defect. And that defect could be shown, as in
Laney's case, by the perceived divine command itself. Conversely,
conviction of Laney would have required a finding that she did in
fact know that her actions were causing the death of her sons and
that doing so was wrong. Taking their testimony at face value,
Laney intended to kill, while Jacques did not. The clearly insane
belief, we might say, if there is one in either case, was that Sam-
uel wouldn't die, even while Jacques was denying him food.14°
V ('inTcT TTQT'XWT
The foregoing discussion of insanity is offered as an illustration
of the problems that arise when we try to apply legal categories
like delusion to religious beliefs. Where is the "neutral" vantage
point from which the law can assess beliefs like Jacques Robi-
doux's and Deanna Laney's? I have neither the space nor the abil-
ity to answer that question here. Nonetheless, such questions -
questions about the very meaning of concepts like "neutrality" and
"rationality" - should be borne constantly in mind when we sur-
vey the terrain on which law and religion collide. They are, how-
ever, outside the scope of Hamilton's book. It may be that in Ham-
ilton's work as a litigator, these sorts of philosophical quandaries
don't often arise. And God vs. the Gavel does not purport to be a
philosophical inquiry into the theoretical relationship between
religion and the law. This is not necessarily a shortcoming in it-
self, but given the centrality to Hamilton's arguments of the con-
cept of "neutrally applicable law," the question of what exactly
"neutrality" entails when God stands before the bench is one that
140. That is, Jacques had specific falsifiable beliefs about causal relationships in the
physical world (Samuel will not eat solid food, but he won't die), beliefs, thus, which do fit
the DSM criteria for delusion. Laney's beliefs, on the other hand, were either purely norma-
tive (God wants me to kill my sons), or unfalsifiable (God is talking to me) and thus do not.
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will have to be faced by other theorists - and by the courts that
are confronted with these cases.
But definitional problems, of course, are most acute at the mar-
gins. And many of the cases Hamilton details are not at the mar-
gins; rather, they can only be described as attempts to exempt re-
ligion from the rule of law entirely. Hamilton is right to insist
that the expansionist tendencies of Free Exercise activism need to
be resisted, lest the Establishment Clause, and indeed the ideal -
however contested - of neutral rules of law, be itself evicted from
the constitutional landscape.
The margins, however, cannot be overlooked for long. As I hope
my discussion of insanity has suggested, the practical question of
how to apply law to religious belief will sometimes require descent
into philosophy and theology. Sometimes the question is not
about explicit legislative or judge-made explicit exemptions for
religious conduct, but rather about the conceptual difficulties in-
herent in applying legal concepts in culturally contested domains.
The rhetoric of neutrality cannot alter, for example, the fact
that it is inescapably an element of murder that the defendant
believed his action would kill the defendant.' Thus the question
of how to treat defendants who kill in the sincere belief that their
actions will not cause harm because God is involved can be tortur-
ously complex. Admittedly these cases arise less often than do,
say, zoning disputes involving church expansion. But reflection on
how best to address the knottiest problems will provide needed
perspective on the seemingly simpler ones. Fundamental consti-
tutional questions can arise in very mundane contexts. Resolving
the ongoing disputes between God and the gavel will require con-
tributions from deep thinkers as well as hard-nosed litigators.
141. Of course, this is not strictly true for felony accomplice murder (e.g. lookout or get-
away car driver) and "depraved indifference" murder. But in those cases, the defendant is
still punished on the basis of what he knew or should have known. Felony murder will only
lie where the murder committed by the accomplice was reasonably foreseeable by the de-
fendant, and depraved indifference murder will only lie where the defendant consciously
ignored the great risk that his actions would kill. A depraved indifference charge requires
that the defendant should have known that his actions were likely to cause death: depraved
indifference is just the strongest form of recklessness. So a sincere belief that Samuel
wouldn't die would presumably be a defense for Jacques on a depraved indifference theory
as well, unless a jury found that any sane person must have known that depriving the boy
of food would kill him. The analysis remains the same: to find Jacques guilty, you have to
find either that he didn't really hold the religious beliefs he said he did, or that the law does
not permit people to take such beliefs seriously as generative principles for action.
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